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This thesis examines the right-to-now provision (Article II, Sec. 9) 
of the Montana Constitution, including its roots in political theory 
since the 18th century, the drafting of the provision during the 
state's 1970-71 Constitutional Convention, and how the provision has 
been considered and interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court
since the Constitution was ratified in 1972.
Primary research sources were philosophers and political theorists, 
beginning with John Locke, who helped develop modern democratic 
theory; the verbatim transcripts of the M ontana Constitutional 
Convention; numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases that dealt with free
speech issues; several law review articles concerning a right of access
to government-held information; and most of the Montana Supreme 
Court cases that involved the right-to-know provision.
This thesis concludes that the right to know remains undeveloped 
and murky as a doctrine in Montana law, and that the constitutional 
provision has received only a modicum of support from the state 
Supreme Court in the two-plus decades since it was ratified. In 
many cases, the court has found ample reasons to circumvent or 
even diminish the right to know.
A right to know is not found in most state constitutions or in the 
U.S. Constitution, but the concept has deep roots in democratic 
theory. Political theorists as far back as Locke and John Stuart Mill 
drew parallels between the importance of free speech and value of 
searching for truth. Modern-da^ writers and thinkers like John 
Rawls and Alexander Meiklejohn articulated their own theories about 
how the free flow of information was essential to a functional 
democracy. The framers of the Montana Constitution, fearing that 
expanding governm ental power would dim inish the role of 
individuals in public affairs, argued that this constitutional provision 
would serve as a check on government's abuse of its power.
Director: Charles Hood
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In tro d u ctio n
Under the compact upon which the 
Constitution rests, it is agreed that men 
shall not be governed by others, that they 
shall govern themselves . . . .  The primary 
purpose of the First Amendment is, then, 
that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, 
understand  issues which bear upon 
common life. That is why no idea, no doubt, 
no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant 
information, may be kept from them.1
Alexander Meiklejohn
No person shall be deprived of the 
right to examine documents or to observe 
the deliberations of all public bodies or 
agencies of state governm ent and its 
subdivisions, except in cases in which the 
dem and of individual privacy clearly  
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
Art. II, Sec. 9, Montana Constitution
The right to know was a new provision in the Montana 
Constitution when it was ratified in 1972. Its explicit language
M eiklejohn, Alexander, Free Speech and its Relation to Self- 
G overnm ent. (N.Y. 1960) p. 75.
1
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protecting citizens' rights to information about their government was 
bold and unusual. The wording is clear and clean, and includes only 
one exception: The privacy rights of individuals, when clearly more 
important than the public’s right to know, can override the right to 
know.
The rationale for this constitutional provision grew, in part, out 
of Montana citizens’ healthy suspicion of government, best expressed 
perhaps by a sentence introducing the state Open Meetings law in 
Montana Code: “The people of the state do not wish to abdicate their 
sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.”2
The constitutional status of a specific right to know is 
relatively new to Montana law, but the concept is as old as 
democratic theory itself, drawing upon centuries of thought about 
government in a free society.
From the 17th century, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, James 
Madison and others built the framework for modern democracy; 
these men believed that an uneducated society was incapable of 
governing itself. They believed in free speech because it was the key 
to an educated citizenry. To them, ignorance was antithetical to 
freedom. Madison, who drafted the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, believed the right to seek knowledge was inherent in 
the right to free speech.
“(A) popular government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or 
perhaps both,” he wrote in 1822. “Knowledge must forever govern
2Montana Code Annotated 2-3-201.
ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must 
arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.”3
Modern political theorists like Alexander M eiklejohn, who 
wrote extensively about free speech in the first part of this century, 
and Harvard University Professor John Rawls, also have promoted
the right to know as a corollary to free speech. “All citizens should
have the means to be informed about political issues,” Rawls wrote in 
A Theory of Justice published in 1971.4
But the words "right to know" or any similar expressions don't
appear in the text of the U.S. Constitution, a fact that for 200 years 
has left judges and scholars arguing about whether the First 
Amendment itself, or any other passages in the Constitution, gives 
citizens a right of access to government secrets.
Retired Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, for example, in 
an analysis of free speech protections, rebuked those who claimed to 
find a right of access to government-held information in the text of 
the U.S. Constitution. Asserting such a right is simply “fuzzy 
thinking,” Stewart said.5
But others disagree. A scattering of court rulings over the years 
have supported the right to know, with some judges arguing, as did 
Mill, Madison and Meiklejohn, that access to government information
3The Writings of James Madison. (G. Hunt ed. 1910) letter from 
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822).
4Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.) p. 225.
5Justice Potter Stewart (retired), The Constitution: That Delicate 
Balance (Film Series). From a round-table discussion with political 
leaders, jurists and journalists.
is essential if citizens are to hold lawmakers accountable and voters 
are to make intelligent and informed decisions.6
During the framing of Montana’s 1972 Constitution, the 
argument over the right to know was thorough and robust. Fears 
about government becoming too large and its ability to control 
in fo rm ation  em boldened M ontanans to d raft and pass a 
constitutional provision that granted its citizens a fundamental right 
to be informed.
Transcripts of the convention show that the debate returned 
repeatedly to two main concerns: How best to protect citizens from 
the power and abuses of government; and how to provide openness 
in society and still protect individual privacy. The solution was to 
give both rights constitutional protection; the document ratified in 
1972 contains both a right to know and a right to privacy.7
The difficulty delegates had in developing the language of both 
of these provisions proved a harbinger of the many significant 
battles to come over these two conflicting rights.
This paper will ultimately discuss the difficult and important 
issue of balancing openness with individual privacy as it examines 
the significant right-to-know cases to come before the Montana 
Supreme Court since 1972.
First, however, this thesis will explore the roots of the right to 
know, beginning with political theorists Locke, Mill and Meiklejohn,
6See e.g. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 84, S.Ct. 710 
(1964); Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
7Montana Constitutional Convention. 1971-72. Volume II, Bill 
of Rights Committee Proposal. Summary of discussion over Sec. 9, 
Right to Know, and Sec. 10, Right to Privacy. 631-633.
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and continuing through the eloquent debates ju st over two decades 
ago by citizen framers of the Montana Constitution.
The Right to Know: Roots in Political Theory
One of the characteristics of representative government is the 
respect it pays to individuals. American democracy in particular is 
guided by a set of individual liberties, of which freedom of speech 
and religion are listed first. None pays more respect to the value of 
an individual than the right to speak and think as you wish.
The men whose theories about self-government guided the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution were themselves guided by different 
motives and dreams. Nonetheless, most placed a higher value on the 
individual than on society or, for that m atter, on a workable 
government. As such, government was a means to an end; a 
m echanism by which individual well-being could be enhanced, 
whether it helped each person develop a stronger sense of morality, 
as Locke would have it, or increase happiness, as Mill wished.
Each vigorously sought to preserve the liberties of conscience. 
The right to think what you want and say what you think was 
precious to these men, each for his own reasons.
John Locke
In John Locke’s ideal commonwealth, individuals vested their 
power in the legislative branch, which sat strictly at the pleasure of 
the people and, he said, “neither must nor can” transfer its power to
6
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any other branch of government or any person.8 He also promoted a 
separation of powers, similar to that found in American government 
today, which vests lawm aking authority  in one branch of 
government, administrative duties in another, and enforcem ent in 
still a third.
In Locke’s view, governm ent existed  solely for the 
convenience of society, to perform limited duties more efficiently 
and effectively than individuals could themselves. Government's first 
duty, Locke believed, was to protect fundamental rights to life, 
liberty and property. These rights, he said, originate from a "state of 
nature," which he described as a circumstance in which people live 
together "according to reason, without a common superior on earth 
with authority to judge between them."9
Natural law, he said, reveals a set of God-given moral rules that 
he believed were self-evident to all rational persons. Within the 
bounds of natural law, man answered to no authority beyond himself 
and God "without asking leave or depending upon the will of any 
other man."10
Within this natural state, Locke said, man must rely on himself 
to protect his liberties and to punish those who would deny his rights 
or take his property.
But it was disadvantageous if not impossible, Locke believed, 
for individuals to protect themselves, since enemies were often
8Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essay Great 
Books of the Western World, University of Chicago, 1952. p. 58.
9Ibid .
10Ibid.
emboldened by their evil and too powerful to defeat single- 
handedly. Thus it was wise and practical, he said, to form a 
commonwealth that relied on the collective power of its citizens to 
settle disputes, protect society from criminals and degenerates, 
preserve claims to property and guarantee liberties of thought and 
conscience. The state’s power, then, was established through a 
contract with its members. The members in turn agreed to submit to 
majority rule in exchange for protection and security.11
Locke’s highest priorities were rights of conscience and 
property. A simplistic account of his theory on property says man in 
his natural state first owned himself. By extension, any products 
from his labor "we may say are properly his."12 The "great and chief 
end" was to protect private property, which Locke believed no man 
or government had the right to take without a person's consent.13
The roots of America’s protections for speech and religion can, 
in part, be traced to Locke's views on religious toleration. By natural 
law, he said, a man has a right to his own opinions, to express them 
and to choose his own form of religion.14 On ethical grounds, Locke 
believed no government nor church had any power to persecute 
people for their beliefs (though he acknowledged the right of 
churches to expel people with contrary views). Similarly, he believed
1 iO'Connor, D.J. John Locke. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 
1967) 205.
12Locke, Concerning Civil Government. Great Books, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (University of Chicago, 1952). p. 30.
13Ibid, p. 53, 57.
14Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration. Great Books, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (University of Chicago, 1952).
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no individual or church should impose its opinions on another,15 
reacting, no doubt, to the turbulent politics of 17th century England 
and the religious persecution of Charles II.
But Locke's own tolerance had its exceptions. He argued, for 
example, that the state had the right to outlaw such religious 
practices as sacrificing humans. He also didn't tolerate either atheists 
or Catholics, two groups he said didn't deserve protection — atheists 
because they rejected God and were therefore w ithout moral 
guidance; Catholics because of their own intolerance of other religious 
interpretations. Locke feared that if Catholics, for example, ever 
gained a majority, they would exert "undue influence" over society 
and likely deny the very liberties of conscience he so highly 
va lued .16
Such practical exceptions are notable for at least a couple of 
reasons. One, they obviously conflict with Locke's general regard for 
individual rights. D. J. O'Connor, an Oxford professor who interpreted 
Lockean thought in this century, suggests that the philosopher's 
essay, Religious Toleration, was meant only to provide a framework 
for society, that Locke knew the value of tolerance as a social policy, 
yet recognized society's need for expediency.17
Finally, Locke was equally fearful of government tyranny, and 
prescribed lim iting the power vested in any com m onwealth. 
Government, he argued, must hold no power beyond what the people 
approve, a notion rooted in his concept of natural law: No one has
15Ibid .
160'Connor, John Locke, pp. 211-215.
17Ibid.
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power over another, and no one can transfer to another more power 
than he has himself.18
Locke also recognized that not all people in society would 
submit to the contract agreeably, that some would inevitably lose 
faith in government and rebel against its power. To maximize trust, 
Locke wanted the relationship between government and its people to 
work like a trusteeship: power may be relinquished but never 
enhanced for government's gain.19 Locke's writings are vague about 
the precise limits of government's power, but O’Connor interprets 
Locke to say that as long as government obeys its citizens, it will 
command their allegiance.20 The trusteeship also allowed the people 
to remove government officials who abused their positions.
"There is no reason for government than to preserve their 
lives, liberties and fortunes," Locke wrote. "To go further — to vest 
more power than that in the state — would make man worse off than 
if  in the state of nature. Giving government more power disarms 
(man) — and arms government — making himself the prey."21
Underlying Locke's design for the commonwealth was belief 
that government would be guided by the moral code man devised 
from natural law, using his good reason and intuition. Such a 
government showed the utmost respect for the individuals who 
established it.
18Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essay Great 
Books.
19Ibid .
20O'Connor, John Locke, p. 209-210.
21Locke, John, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essav.
John Stuart Mill
John Stuart Mill's concern for the individual was less about 
preserving God-given liberties than it was about increasing human 
happiness and self-development. To Mill, liberties were utilitarian, 
tools people could use primarily for self-improvement. His thoughts 
about good and evil were more secular; morality to M ill was
independent of a God or any concept of natural law.22
Mill believed that all questions about individuals "are reduced 
to questions about their happiness." His goal was not to promote a set 
of ethical rules for people or society; they held no ultimate value for 
him. Mill believed people behaved rightly if their actions promoted 
happiness, wrongly if they promoted the reverse.23
His "principle of individuality" emphasized "the importance of 
self-developm ent, self-im provem ent, self-form ation, se lf-respect, 
conscience and honor," and that all men should be respected as ends 
in themselves, and not for their moral values or relationship to 
G o d .24 In that sense, individuality was to Mill equivalent to self­
development. Similarly, liberty to Mill was personal and essential to 
se lf-developm ent.
Mill's structure of self-government may be similar to Locke’s in
many ways, yet he valued it differently. Government was useful to
Mill primarily as a means to maximize happiness. If it could provide
22Anshutz, R.P., The Philosophy of J.S. Mill. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1953) p. 17.
23John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Essential Works of John Stuart 
Mill. ed. Max Lemer, 1961.) Bantam Books, New York, N.Y.
24Anschutz, The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p. 20.I
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security and protect liberties better than an individual could by 
himself, then it was useful, Mill believed. Mill also saw democracy as 
a remedy for ignorance and a tool for self-improvement. Mill wanted 
people to participate in government; participation meant education. 
Democracy, he wrote, allows for the “utmost possible publicity and 
liberty of discussion, whereby ... the whole public are ... sharers in 
the instruction and mental exercise derivable from it.”25
Thus he was able to argue for the widest possible extension of 
representative government.
But Mill held elitist views about the intellectual pursuit of 
happiness, which colored how he imagined democracy should work. 
He believed that the best educated, those with the most varied 
experience, were in the best position to make right decisions about 
self-government. This idea provided the foundation for his proposal 
for "plural voting" — giving those who are wiser a greater voice in 
democracy, which he believed would maximize everyone's happiness. 
He w orried, conversely, that true representative governm ent 
tolerated a low-grade of intelligence, which he believed to be a 
problem with early American democracy.26 As he aged, the worry 
grew, and toward the end of his life, Mill admitted he dreaded most 
"the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the 
mass... .”27
25John Stuart Mill, Representative Government. Second Essav. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, The University of Chicago, 1952. p. 344.
26Anschutz, The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, p. 45.
27Ibid. p. 30.
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To Mill, the biggest question regarding government was how 
to avoid being ruled by corrupt men. Corrupt leaders not only put 
their interests above that of society, but denied the less educated — 
usually the poor — from the means of self-development. "The poor ... 
cannot any longer be governed and treated like children," he said.28
Mill wanted legislative bodies (ill suited, he thought, to actually 
govern) to be watchdogs over government : “To throw the light of 
publicity on its acts: to compel a full exposition and justification of all 
of them which one considers questionable.”29 If, as Locke suggested, 
one of the functions of government is to provide security, then what 
better role could the legislature fill than to monitor its leaders and to 
remove them from office if they failed to perform honestly and 
fairly, Mill concluded.
Mill agreed with Locke, if for somewhat different reasons, that 
government should have no power beyond that which the people 
gave it. Mill recognized "no authority whatever in society over the 
individual, except to enforce equal freedom of development... ."30
It was for the utility of it, then, that Mill argued for liberties. 
Freedom of speech and conscience and participation were essential 
for intellectual development, from which happiness resulted. If, as 
Mill reasoned, bad decisions in democracy resulted from ignorance, 
then the converse is also true — that information and education 
produce better, if not good, decisions. Mill and Locke, in their own
28Ibid. p. 21.
29J.S. Mill, Representative Gov't. Second Essav. Britannica, p.
361.
30J.S. Mill, Autobiography. (Essential Works).
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ways and for different reasons, laid groundwork for the free flow of 
information as an essential element in the liberties of speech and 
conscience.
"It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men’s 
opin ions,"31 Locke wrote in thel680s. More than 200 years later, Mill 
said, “Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and 
argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the 
mind, must be brought before it.”32
JoBim Rawls
In his writings, John Rawls, the modern-day political theorist at 
Harvard, bases his “first principle of justice” on an assumption that “a 
democratic regime presupposes freedom of speech and assembly, 
and liberty of thought and conscience.”33
Rawls adheres to M ill’s belief that without these liberties, 
political affairs cannot be conducted rationally. If the idea is to have 
free and open public discussion, then all people must have access to 
the process, Rawls argues. But Rawls departs from Mill in that he 
(Rawls) shows more respect for individuals based on their intrinsic 
value as persons. Where Mill embraces plural voting, given his belief 
that better-educated and more intelligent people make better 
decisions and therefore are in a better position to maximize 
happiness for all, Rawls simply recognizes the expediency of it. Rawls
31Locke, Concerning Toleration. Great Books, p. 3.
32John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Essential Works).
33John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 225.
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would prefer that democracy be established in a way that all persons 
have equal footing and an even chance in life; the very act of 
participating, or structuring society so everyone has the same chance 
to participate, shows proper respect for each individual, Rawls
proposes.34
For Rawls, free speech is one im portant step to equal
participation; the only way citizens can fully develop ideas and 
thoughts, and expect those ideas to have equal weight in a discussion, 
is to assure everyone has equal access to information.35
Put another way, if we respect the value of individuals
participating in a democracy, then denying information to some, 
while others have it, is a contradiction. Such selective sharing
disregards the principle that all people have intrinsic worth, have the
ability to think on their own, and can vote rationally.
These “liberties of conscience” lose much of their value, Rawls 
further argues, when some in society have greater means than others 
to “control the course of public debate.” Inevitably, those with 
“greater means” will exercise greater influence over such things as 
legislation and public policy.36
Like Mill and Locke, Rawls never explicitly equates a right of 
access to information on par with free speech as a political liberty, 
but his belief in the invoilability of the individual may draw him 
closer than either of the others to such an argument. Only when
access to inform ation is guaranteed can the uneducated or
34Ibid. p. 233-234.
35Ibid. 225. .
36Ibid.
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uninformed participate in democracy with an expectation that their 
ideas and opinions can fully develop and have weight. If we respect 
the individual, then we owe each one the opportunity to be informed 
and share influence.
Equal political rights of participation can heighten the “self­
esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen,” 
Rawls says, as people engage in discussion, disagree, defend ideas 
and opinions, weigh other interests and acquire a sense of duty and 
obligation to participate. In this sense, “equal political liberty is not 
solely a means ... These freedoms strengthen men’s sense of their 
own self worth, enlarge their intellectual and moral sensibilities and 
lay the basis for a sense of duty and obligation upon which the 
stability of just institutions depends.”37
Alexander Meiklejohn
Alexander M eiklejohn was a 20th-century educator turned 
philosopher. He is known among free-speech scholars for his 
^analysis of the political theory embodied in the free-speech clause of 
the F irst Amendment.38 While he wouldn't fully embrace Rawls' 
theories about individuals, his writings suggest his respect for the 
dignity of individuals, which he claims is embodied in the language
37Ibid. p. 234
38Michael Hayes, 73 Virginia Law Review. Sept. '87. 
Meiklejohn's discourse on Free Speech "is generally regarded as the 
seminal work on the link between the First Amendment and self- 
governm ent."
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of the U.S. Constitution. The right to know as a corollary to free 
speech is a prominent theme in his work.
Meiklejohn, in the wake of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
famous “clear and present danger” test outlined in a post-World War
I Supreme Court case,39 sketched out a political theory based on a
fundamental respect for the dignity of individuals. In Meiklejohn’s 
view of democracy under the U.S. Constitution, Americans “are 
pledged together to create a society in which men shall have the 
status of governors of themselves.”40 Creation of self-government is 
hard work and “[i]ts victories are won, not by the carnage of battle, 
but by the sweat and agony of the mind,”41 he wrote. In criticizing 
Holmes’ belief that speech may be restrained when it presents a 
clear and present danger to society, Meiklejohn was adamant: “ [N]o 
idea, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information” 
may be kept from the people in a democratic society.42
From Locke onward -- though each theorist promoted his own
brand of liberalism — these thinkers all argued for the basic right to 
free speech and liberties of conscience. Locke's view held that the 
right to hold and express opinions fell in with natural rights, God 
given, to be used for the right moral purposes, to preserve religious 
beliefs and, on another level, to protect property. It was also a
39See Schenk v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919) Holmes 
argued that when speech presented a "clear and present" danger, it 
was not necessarily protected by the First Amendment.
40Meiklejohn, Free Speech, p. 70.
41 Ibid. p. 10.
42Ibid. p. 75.
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qualified right which could be withheld from some for the purposes 
of preserving liberty and upholding the principles of natural law.
For Mill, who held a more libertarian view, rights and liberties, 
free speech included, were a utility, to be used and protected as a 
means to self-development. He reasoned that free speech had value 
for increasing happiness for the individual, and served its role in 
government by allowing individuals to check its abuses, or remove 
corrupt leaders. Mill (the elitist) also argued that free speech was 
perhaps more important for some than others, since in a practical 
sense, the better-educated were in a better position to make
important decisions in society. Finally, Mill argues that free speech 
was simply a valuable tool for self-development.
Rawls would value free speech because it was essential to
participation in the political process — not too different from the 
utilitarian view — and because denying such a liberty showed 
disrespect for the intrinsic worth of individuals.
Meiklejohn, whose influence is more limited to modern political
theory, took rather more seriously the freedom of speech for its
vital role in making democracy work. As a socialist, he fought for the
freedom  to promote unpopular beliefs and believed the F irst 
Amendment provided such protection at a minimum.
Obviously these men, among others, influenced not ju st the 
structure of American government, but its application. Individual 
perspectives aside, each placed a high value on both the functional 
and philosophical values embodied in freedom of speech and
freedom of conscience. In the final analysis, it is important to
19
recognize that that the First Amendment, as it came to be written 
and interpreted, distinguishes between at least two liberties, or 
values. One, the freedom of religion language and, in some 
interpretations, the free speech clause, is designed to protect 
individual autonomy, including the liberties of conscience outlined 
most clearly by Locke and Mill. Because perhaps they lived in times 
when rulers were more inclined to proscribe religion and impose on 
matters of conscience, these philosophers concerned themselves to a 
greater extent with the freedom to be left alone, the freedom to 
think and conduct themselves as they wished. Religious freedom 
served that end, and to an extent, so did freedom of speech — the 
right to think what you want was insignificant without the right to 
freely express it, exchange views with others, debate and search for 
truth. In one sense, then, freedom of religion and speech were critical 
to the development of an individual, and critical to a definition of 
autonom y.
In another sense, however, the First Amendment and its free- 
speech language was more concerned w ith the function of 
democracy. This value was developed perhaps more thoroughly by 
Mill, who took a somewhat mechanical view of democracy. To 
interpret him in the context of the First Amendment might go 
something like this: Democracy is the best form of government to 
promote overall happiness. Freedom of expression is essential to 
make democracy work, therefore in democracy, a constitution must 
protect speech for its value in promoting happiness.
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Rawls and Meiklejohn, of course, concerned themselves too 
with free speech — and free press — as instruments of democracy. 
Rawls likes free speech for its guarantee of equal participation 
(which of course is also an autonomy issue), while Meiklejohn is 
more direct in his assertion that democracy cannot fully function 
without free speech and free press.
It must also be said, of course, that the instrumental value and 
the autonomy value of the freedoms protected in the F irst 
Amendment create an inherent conflict. The value of autonomy is
linked inextricably to the value we place on privacy, and our 
expectations that we will be let alone to think and believe and 
discuss matters as we wish. The instrumental value of the First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and press are linked directly with
our notions of -- and our desire for — publicity. If democracy is to
function properly, its citizens must be able to depend on the free 
flow of information.
These separate values, explored and developed by political 
theorists for centuries, remain in conflict today, and are present in 
most First Amendment arguments, both legal and philosophical. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has struggled through the years over the 
instrum enta l and autonom y values im bedded in the F irst 
Amendment, although many of the important access-to-information
cases concentrated more on the instrumental values of the free 
speech and press clauses. And, as we shall see, the framers of 
M ontana's new constitution also sought to diminish the tension
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between these two important values, which they called the right to 
privacy and the right to know.
2 2
The Supreme Court and the Right to Know
In the classic F irst Amendment confrontation over the 
publication of the government's secret history of the Vietnam War, 
known as the Pentagon Papers, in 1971,43 Justice Hugo Black issued a 
stern message to the president and Congress, chastising them for 
keeping secrets from the people in the name of national security.
“The guarding of military and diplom atic secrets at the 
expense of informed representational government provides no real 
security for our Republic,” he wrote. Rather, Black said, the 
foundation of real security in American society is the F irst 
Amendment, which guarantees the very rights that the government 
sought to restrict — freedom of speech and of the press. "The 
Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government," Black 
said .44
But Justice Black, an absolutist on issues of free speech in a 
democracy, was unusual. Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
never ruled that the Constitution offers unqualified protection for a 
right to know.
However, in cases scattered over history, the high court has 
given the right to know some support, in direct and indirect ways. 
Publishers, for example, are protected from prior restraint by a
43New York Times v. U.S.. 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971)
44Ibid.
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landmark ruling, Near v. M innesota.45 in 1931 that said restraining 
publication was "the essence of censorship." N ear didn't address the 
issue of citizen's right to know, of course, but it was an important 
early ruling: Had N ear upheld prior restraint, the whole argument for 
access to government inform ation would have been severely 
diminished. Forty years later, the Pentagon Papers case reaffirmed 
and elaborated on the vital role of the press to "bare the secrets of 
government and inform the people." A right of access to criminal 
courts was established in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers. Inc.:46 a 
subsequent case extended the right of access to jury selection;47 and 
still another struck down a state law that required the courtroom to 
be closed during testimony from minors in sexual abuse trials.48
Beyond criminal trials and related proceedings, the Supreme 
Court has said that the right to government-held information is at 
best a qualified right; but in both dissents and majority opinions 
justices have repeatedly linked the right to know with what one 
justice called the "core purpose" of the First Amendment — that 
citizens have a right to participate in democracy.49
45Near v. Minnesota el rel. Olson. 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 
(1931).
46Richmond Newspapers. Inc.. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
47Press-Enterprise Co. V. Superior Court. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
48Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
49 Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 575. Chief Justice Burger 
wrote that the freedoms of speech and press, and the rights to 
assemble and petition the government "share a common core 
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to 
the functioning of government."
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In a 1974 dissent, for example, Justice Lewis Powell disagreed 
with the ruling that denied newspaper reporters the righ t to 
interview convicts in a prison. Powell argued that the political ends 
of a democracy demanded a different decision: “(P)ublic debate must 
not only be unfettered; it must also be informed.”50
Similarly, in 1980 Justice W illiam Brennan wrote in his 
concurrence with Richmond N ewspapers, the case where a Virginia 
newspaper sued for the right to attend a murder trial, that an 
informed citizenry is “necessary for a democracy to survive.”51
Such declarations, of course, fall short of making the right to 
know a constitutionally protected liberty equal to free speech. In a 
1987 analysis of the right to know in the Virginia Law Review, 
author Michael Hayes says that until R ichm ond  granted courtroom 
access inl980, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly rejected claims of 
a co n stitu tio n a l righ t of access to governm en t-con tro lled  
inform ation.”52
But since 1931, when Near v. M innesota prohibited the 
government from restraining publication of defamatory information 
on F irst Amendment grounds, the court also has repeatedly 
recognized the relationship between free speech and effective 
democracy. It was inl936, in a case about taxation and the press,53 
when, according to Hayes, the court firs t recognized the
50Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.. 417 U.S. 862-63 (1974).
51Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 588.
52Hayes, "Whatever Happened to the ’Right to Know’?" 73 
Virginia Law Review. Sept. 1987.
53Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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“fundam ental link between the F irst Am endm ent and self- 
governm ent.”
But then in i965, when a plaintiff claimed that a ban on travel 
to Cuba restricted his First Amendment right to gather information 
about government policies, the court said, "The right to speak and 
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather 
in f o r m a t io n ." 54 In 1974, the court limited reporters' rights to 
interview prisoners55 and then, in 1978, reaffirmed that position.56
In 1979, the court refused in Gannett v. DePasquale to grant 
public access to a pretrial suppression hearing. The ruling was 
controversial and confusing because many, including Justice 
Blackmun who dissented, interpreted it to mean that the right of 
access to the e n t i r e  trial could be denied, based not on First 
Amendment grounds but on an interpretation of the right to a public 
trial guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment.57
Meanwhile, the case for access was slowly growing, pushed in 
part by the dissents of Justice Powell58 and Justice John Paul 
S te v e n s ,59 both of whom argued that traditional political theory 
supports the right to know.
54Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
55Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
56Houchins v. KOED. Inc.. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
57See Richmond Newspapers concurrence by Justice Blackmun, 
who took one more opportunity to criticize G annett and acknowledge 
the confusion it caused journalists.
58Saxhe. 417, U.S. 843, 862-63. It is here tht Powell said "Public 
debate must not only be unfettered, it must be informed."
59Houchins v. KOED. Inc.. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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Then in 1980, R ich m o n d  N e w s p a p e rs  provided a 
breakthrough. The court's ruling that the public had a constitutional 
right to attend criminal trials meant, in Hayes’ view, that “a right of 
access was born.”60
Chief Justice W arren Burger wrote the lead opinion in 
R ic h m o n d : in all, seven justices agreed that a right of access was 
im plicit in the F irst Amendment.61 In his concurrence, Justice 
Stevens called it "a watershed case" because "never before has (the 
court) squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is 
entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever... ,62
Burger's opinion relied in part on a political theory argument, 
saying that access to trials is part of the “core purpose” of the First 
A m endm ent.63 Burger also relied on a classic conservative argument, 
that a long tradition of openness in criminal trials also supported the 
right. But Burger's decision was narrowly drawn, saying that in 
access cases outside criminal trials where a tradition of openness 
doesn’t exist, access could be denied.64
In his concurrence (joined by Justice Marshall), Justice Brennan 
also relied on political theory, yet warned that a right of access was 
“ theore tica lly  end less,”65 and proposed guidelines to help lower 
courts rule in subsequent cases. First, a right of access was
60Hayes, 73 Virginia LR. p. 1115.
61 Eight justices took part in this case and wrote a total of seven 
opinions, including one dissent. Justice Powell did not vote.
62Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. 555.
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
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strengthened by a tradition of openness. Second, access must play a 
“significant positive role” in the process or function of government. 
When these two tests were met, he said, then government must have 
a “compelling” interest to support closure.66
This was significant. As Justice Stevens added in his concurring 
opinion: "For the first time, the Court unequivocally holds than an 
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an 
abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by 
the First Amendment."67
R ich m o n d  had the added benefit of eliminating some of the 
confusion in G anne tt: now it was clear at least that the trial itself was 
open.
Two years later, Brennan applied his own guidelines from 
R ichm ond in a case that struck down a Massachussets' law requiring 
judges to exclude the public from the testimony of minors in sexual 
abuse cases.68 In writing the majority opinion, Brennan relied on the 
reasoning in R ichm ond that the purpose of the First Amendment is to 
ensure that citizens can "effectively participate in and contribute to 
our republican system of self-government."69 O n c e  a g a in ,
however, the decision applied only to criminal trials. In 1984, the 
Supreme Court found a right of access to voir dire, or jury selection, a 
proceeding obviously connected to, but technically outside, the trial 
i ts e lf .70 Brennan's "tradition of openness" and "contribution to
66Ibid .
67Ibid.
68Globe Newspapers Co. 457 U.S. 596.
69Ibid .
70Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
28
function" tests played a role in this decision and in some subsequent 
lower court cases, but have never become legal doctrine.
M eanwhile, in some lower courts a d ifferent trend was 
emerging, according to Hayes. More and more, judges in federal and 
state courts began using a balancing test to determine the strength of 
a First Amendment right of access. As applied, the test would weigh 
"the public 's interest in obtaining ... inform ation against the 
government's interest in refusing to provide it."71
The balancing test implicitly says, of course, that the right to 
know is limited; courts could, and did, find that privacy, property or 
fair trial rights could overrule or limit access to information. In one 
case out of Pennsylvania, Capital Cities Inc. v. Chester.72 the Third 
Circuit Court used Brennan's test to deny access to state records, and 
in so doing recommended that some sort of balancing test was 
preferable to Brennan’s approach in determining the public's right to 
know. And that job, the court said, was best left to state lawmakers, 
not judges.
In 1986, the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader sought documents 
from the state Department of Environmental Resources, hoping to 
prove its suspicion that the state had discrim inated in its 
enforcem ent of laws covering contamination of groundwater. The 
state refused to release the documents and the Times Leader sued 
and lost. In an appeal to the Third Circuit, the newspaper contended 
that the denial of access to a public agency’s records “abridged the
71 Hayes, Virginia Law Review, p. 1126.
72797 F2d 1164. (3rd Cir. 1986)
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public’s historic [F]irst [A]mendment right to information to evaluate 
the government’s effectiveness.”73
The Third Circuit rejected the newspaper’s argument based on 
one part of Brennan’s test, and said the newspaper failed to prove 
that a historical tradition of access to the agency’s documents existed. 
Moreover, the court said, that since the Supreme Court has never 
recognized an absolute right of access in the First Amendment, it 
placed the judiciary in the position of deciding between competing 
political interests. That job, the court said, should be done in the 
leg isla tu re .74
The notion of politicians determining rights of access is not 
new, of course. Legislatures in every state have passed laws 
regulating open meetings, records and more. But the approach has 
inherent problems, including unending conflicts between the self- 
protective instincts of politicians and bureaucrats, and the public’s 
need for maximum information. And it raises at least one important 
question: How can citizens participate fully in making laws regulating 
openness if they don’t already have full access to information, and
73Barbara Greenberg, 33 Journal of Urban and Contemporary 
Law . Washington University, Summer 1988. A review and 
com m entary .
74Ibid. NOTE: Greenberg assailed the court's decision: "The 
Third Circuit refused to read the Supreme Court's decisions as 
mandating an expansion of the First Amendment protection ... the 
Third Circuit denigrated the Supreme Court's recognition of the right 
of access." Greenberg also pointed out that Brennan's tradition of 
openness test would require the newspaper to show that the 
agency’s documents had ben "generally available during the colonial 
period ... Proving a tradition of access is virtually impossible because 
few governmental agencies existed at that time."
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are unaware of issues or corruption already held secret? And, as 
Judge Gibbons pointed out in his dissent on Capital Cities, there is 
something fundamentally disturbing about "a model of government 
in which elected officials are deemed to have the delegated power to 
decide for us what we need to know."75
The political process has not, however, been unresponsive. The 
Freedom of Information Act was passed by Congress in 1966 and 
requires government agencies to produce information on request, 
unless the information is restricted under one of nine exemptions.7 6 
(It is common knowledge, at least among journalists, that the 
procedures for requesting information under FOIA are onerous and 
expensive, and often obstructive, given the broadness of the 
exem ptions.)
State access laws, in most cases, also contain broad exemptions, 
according to a survey by Hayes. Montana's Open Meetings law is a 
case in point: Until recently struck down, provisions in the law 
allowed meetings to be closed for discussion of collective bargaining 
or litigation. The law also has a privacy exemption.77 And, for better 
or for worse, Montana code contains scores of other statutes that 
restrict access to courts, records, and meetings, each attempting
75Ibid.
76Freedom of Information Act. U.S. Code, vol. 28, sec. 552 (a)
(3). The exemptions allow the government to withhold information in 
the following general categories: national defense, foreign policy, 
information protected by statute, trade secrets or commercial 
information that is privileged or confidential, medical files, 
investigative records of law agencies and even some geological and 
geophysical information.
77Montana Codes Annotated 2-3-201 through 203. (1987)
31
presumably to strike a balance between the public's right to know 
and a perceived need for privacy or secrecy.78 How some of these
laws have stood up against Montana’s constitutional right to know is,
of course, what this paper ultimately will explore.
In summary, a brief look at judicial history makes clear that 
the courts have never fully embraced Justice Black's absolutist 
appeal, nor the somewhat more qualified approach to free speech 
liberties taken by Alexander Meiklejohn.
Even though N ear. R ichm ond. G lobe and New York Times, for 
example, all considered free speech for its value to the functioning of 
democracy (not necessarily as it conflicted with autonomy and 
related liberties of conscience) a federal right to know is today at
best a limited right without the same protection as freedom of
speech; it has its firmest footing in the criminal courtrooms, and is 
shakier outside the courts. The lower courts, and as we shall see, 
M ontana judges, increasingly are applying balancing tests to 
determine access rights, which may be more in line with one of John 
Rawls' main principles; the individual has only as much right to 
liberty as is compatible with the liberty of others.
Nonetheless, as Hayes points out, at least a balancing test 
presumes a right to government-held information exists.
78MCA, Title 1, p. 7. (1987) The intent here is to draw attention 
to the plethora of legislation related to the right to know. A more 
complete inspection of the statutes is beyond the scope of this paper.
Roots in Montana: The 1972 Constitutional Convention
On Feb. 22, 1972, the Bill of Rights committee presented its 
work to the Montana Constitutional Convention. Wade Dahood, who 
was chairman of the committee and a Butte attorney, introduced the
documents with language that captured the essence of democratic
theory:
“The guidelines and protections for the exercise of liberty in a 
free society,”  Dahood wrote, “come not from the government but 
from the people who create the government.” 79
That prim ary concept of self-governm ent provided the
foundation for the entire Declaration of Rights, which included Art. 
II, Sec. 9, Montana’s unique “right to know” provision. Dahood’s 
committee recommended that such concepts as the right to privacy 
and the right to know should be given, for the first time in Montana, 
constitutional protection. Government must never forget that it was 
“created solely for the welfare of the people,”  the committee wrote.80 
The committee then offered, among 35 enumerated rights, two
articles that defined and guaranteed the citizen’s right of access: the 
right to participate and the right to know.81
79Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-1972. Vol. II: Bill 
of Rights Committee Proposal, p. 619.
80Ibid.
8 Constitution of the State of Montana, art. II, sec. 8 (1972). The 
Right of Participation: "The public has the right to expect 
governmental agencies to afford such reasonable opportunity for 
citizen participation in the operation of the agencies prior to the final 
decision as may be provided by law."
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The committee prefaced its introduction of the draft bill of 
rights with a comment: Montanans typically distrust government 
authority, and the drafters said they hoped the constitutional right to 
participate "will play a role in reversing the dissatisfactions 
increasingly expressed regarding bureaucratic authority insulated 
from public scrutiny ... .”82
The right to know, which the committee called a "companion 
provision" to the right to participate, arises “out of the increasing 
concern ... that government’s sheer bigness threatens the effective 
excercise of citizenship... .”83
The committee then quoted from the preamble to the state 
Open Meetings Law, which had existed in Montana codes since 1963: 
“The people of the state do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to 
the agencies which serve them.”84
Thus the stage was set. The constitutional rights to know and to 
participate were rooted in historical skepticism t|h a t government 
would ignore the source of its powers and abuse the powers 
delegated to it. The provisions also suggest the drafters desire that 
these rights would encourage Montana citizens to fully excercise the 
fundamental duty in a democracy, to be governors rather than 
simply be governed. Thus the right to know emphasized the value of 
free speech in making government work better.
82Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. II, p. 631.
83Ibid .
84Revised Codes of Montana. 82-3401, 1947. This language 
remains in the preamble to the state Open Meetings Law. See MCA 2 - 
3 -201 .
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This language, too, reflects several of the fears, concerns and 
issues raised by the early philosophers like Mill and Locke. Dahood's 
words, for example, that government was created "solely for the 
welfare of the people" embraces Locke's notion that "there is no 
reason for government than to preserve their lives, liberties and 
fo r tu n e s ." 85 Moreover, the Open Meetings Law preamble — "the 
people ... do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty" — is strikingly 
similar to an element of Locke’s natural law theory, that no one 
individual has power over another, and that therefore government 
should have no power beyond what the people approve.
The bill of rights committee worried about a loss of trust 
between citizens and government and hoped that excercising the 
rights to know and participate would rebuild that trust. Locke 
believed government would command the allegiance of its citizens if 
it used its power only for the public's benefit. John Stuart Mill 
worried about this issue on two levels; one, that corrupt leaders 
would put their own interests first, and, two, ordinary citizens would 
be denied the opportunity to participate in government, an excercise 
that he believed would increase their knowledge and skills.
And so, the framers by their discussion and their intent were 
attempting to resolve the conflict within the First Amendment. There 
is a correlation between freedoms of speech and press and the right 
to know as they contribute to the functioning of democracy, they 
said. When it comes to making government work and encouraging 
the fullest participation and development of citizens, the framers
85Locke, Concerning Civil Government. Second Essav.
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wanted to go further than simply guaranteeing free speech and a 
free press. In a sense, the right to know was an attempt to further 
clarify what is meant by free speech and a free press. I f  th e  
delegates were fierce in their desire for open government, they were 
equally passionate about protecting the autonomy of its citizens. The 
minutes of the convention reveal the extent of the debate over the 
wording of the privacy and right-to-know provisions. Since judges 
and lawmakers alike in the years to come would search these 
passages not just for the plain meanings, but also for their intent, 
each word was carefully chosen and fully discussed.
The obvious conflict between privacy and the right to know 
would leave for the courts and legislatures the difficult job of finding 
a fair and equitable balance. But which branch of government should 
take the lead role in determining that balance? Should the language 
of the constitution suggest whether income tax returns are public or 
private? Should it say whether school board meetings are open or 
closed, and why? Obviously, no article in the constitution could 
address individual cases, so the debate centered on the question of 
how, within the spare language of a constitutional provision, to 
provide broad guidance to the courts and the legislature.
Records of the debate over the right to know show little 
appetite for an unqualified right to know; the privacy exemption was 
a key element from the beginning. However, delegate Dorothy Eck, 
w orrying that governm ent agencies may use the exem ption 
unwisely, argued for language that favored openness. Thus, she 
prompted the drafting committee to amend the original language
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with ju s t one word: clearly .86 As finally proposed to the full 
convention then, Art. II, Sec. 9 said:
No person shall be deprived of the right 
to examine documents or to observe the 
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies 
of state government and its subdivisions, 
except in cases in which the demands of 
individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits 
of public disclosure (emphasis added).
Again the debate turned to the issue of who should arbitrate 
the balance. Some delegates wanted the legislature to have the 
power and argued for the words "except as may be provided by law" 
to be inserted. When privacy rights clashed with the right to know, 
some delegates worried that the courts were too slow and
cumbersome to react with speed and efficiency. The opposition
argued legislators should not be encouraged to fashion their own 
exemptions to the right to know, believing lawmakers were too 
inclined to vote for the secrecy that bureaucrats and politicians so 
often desired.87
Ultimately, the phrase was rejected, and the provision reflected 
what the framers intended: the ultimate authority for interpreting
the balance between privacy and the right to know should lie with
the courts.
But the debate wasn’t over. The Montana press vigorously 
resisted the privacy exemption, and lobbied the delegates to throw it 
out. The Missoulian editorialized that the right-to-know provision as
86Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. V, Verbatim Transcript, 1670-71. 
8 7 Ibid. 1971-1679.
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written was a “right to conceal,” reasoning that government agencies 
could use the privacy exemption to hide whatever information they 
wished. The Montana Press Association and some of its members 
agreed, arguing that the exemption was so vaguely worded as to 
allow government agencies routinely to operate in secret and claim 
privacy exemptions for their own convenience.88 But the pleas were 
ultimately rejected, and the privacy exemption remained.
In the end, the convention proposed a unique article to the new 
state Constitution. Citizens had, as a fundamental liberty, the right of 
access to the workings of their government. The framers' intent was 
clear and the delegates felt the final wording accomplished several 
important things: Article II, Section 9 guaranteed the right to know, 
except when the demands of individual privacy89 outweighed it; 
those demands of privacy must “clearly” exceed the public’s right to 
know, tipping the balance in favor of openness. And finally, the 
debate — and the ultimate drafting of the right to know provision 
itself — would clarify that for government to function best in 
Montana, it's citizens must have the right to know what it was doing.
88Ibid. 1672-73.
89COMMENT: At one point in the Con Con debate, a delegate 
inquired whether "individual*1 could also mean a corporation. The 
question implicitly anticipated the time when a corporation or 
perhaps even a government agency might claim the right to 
"individual privacy." Wade Dahood, chairman of the Bill of Rights 
Committee, responded that "an individual, in my judgment, would 
not be a corporation." Later, a Montana Supreme Court ruled just the 
opposite, and extended individual privacy rights to a telephone 
company. See Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Dept, of 
Public Service Regulation. 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981).
Legislative Im plem entation
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The framers’ hopes that the legislature would show restraint in 
its interpretation of the right to know were soon diminished.
M ontana Code Annotated is flush with statutes that d irect
governm ent agencies on how to manage public access to the
government’s business. MCA lists scores of statutes covering access
to judicial proceedings, student records, law enforcement documents, 
child custody and child abuse matters, medical records, parole board 
proceedings, weather modification records and more.90
The most important, perhaps, of all these enactments is the
Montana Open Meetings Law, which is a broad statute directing all 
public boards and agencies to perm it public access to their
deliberations. It states in part:
The legislature finds and declares that
public boards, commissions, councils, and 
other public agencies in this state exist to aid 
in the conduct of the peoples’ business. It is 
the intent of this part that actions and
deliberations of all agencies shall be
conducted openly. The people of the state do 
not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the 
agencies which serve them. Toward these
ends, the provisions of the part shall be 
liberally construed.91
Subsequent provisions of the law, as revised in 1987, spell out
more clearly what openness means, and further define what is meant
90M CA, Title 1, p. 7. (1987)
91M C A . 2-3-201 (1987)
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by “public boards, commissions, councils, and other public agencies...” 
The statute also defines a "meeting" as "the convening of a quorum of 
the constituent membership ... ."
It also addresses individual privacy in section (3), which reads:
... the presiding officer of any meeting 
may close the meeting during the time the 
discussion relates to a matter of individual 
privacy and then if and only if the presiding 
officer determ ines that the dem ands of
individual privacy clearly exceed the merits
of public disclosure. The right of individual 
privacy may be waived by the individual 
about whom the discussion pertains and, in 
that event, the meeting shall be open.92
An additional section stipulated that meetings may be closed
“to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to collective 
bargaining or litigating position of the public agency.”93 In 1990 and 
in 1992, the M ontana Supreme Court struck down collective 
bargaining and litigation exemptions, saying the plain language of
the constitution was clear that individual privacy was the only 
exception to openness.94
Within the many other laws regarding open government, much 
of the language directs how and under what circumstances state 
agencies or boards must make deliberations and records open to 
public inspection. However, many also restrict or deny access in some
92Ibid. 2-3-203 (1), (2).
93Ibid. (4)
94See Associated Press et. al. v. Board of Education. 246 Mont. 
386 (1991) and Great Falls Tribune Company. Inc.. v. Great Falls 
Public Schools. 255 Mont. 125.
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way. For example, the state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, which 
oversees the exploration and development of oil and gas reserves, is 
perm itted by statute to keep confidential any so-called "trade
secrets" it inherits in the course of routine business.95 Law 
enforcement agencies can restrict access to information when the 
need for "law enforcement security" exceeds the public’s right to
k n o w .96 These examples typify perhaps what the framers hoped to
prevent: legislation that allows secrecy with no constitutional
authority. On their face, neither of these laws conform to the
language of the right to know. Extending confidentiality to trade 
secrets grants privacy rights to corporations, a step the framers 
explicitly declined to take. Law enforcement security needs are 
addressed nowhere in the Constitution, and if tested, may well meet 
the same fate as the exemptions for litigation and collective 
bargaining.
In any case, as the Constitutional Convention debates foretold, 
perhaps, the leg islature needed no encouragem ent to w rite 
legislation to further define the right to know and the right to 
privacy. The only question left, then, is whether the statutory 
enactments remained true to the language and the intent of the 
Montana Constitution.
95MCA 82-11-117.
96MC A 7-1-4144.
The Montana Cases
Since the new constitution was ratified in 1972, 13 Supreme 
Court cases have tested the right to know provision.97
One measure of a constitutional liberty like the right to know is 
whether it can withstand legislative enactments. It is the role of the 
judiciary to decide if laws conform to — and respect — fundamental 
rights granted by a constitution. Open meeting and privacy statutes 
are increasingly being tested before the Montana Supreme Court. 
This section examines most of those cases and the paper concludes 
with an assessment how the language and intent of Article II, Section 
9 has stood up to scrutiny over the past two decades.
Open Meetings
In the cases that tested the government's power to close 
m eetings, the agencies routinely asserted they had met the 
requirements of the open meetings law. But in two such cases the 
Supreme Court found flagrant violations.98 A third case presented,
97University of Montana Law Library indices, Pacific Reporter 
2d. and Montana Reports.
98Board of Trustees v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Yellowstone Countv 606 P.2d 1069 (Mont. 1980) and Jarussi v. Board 
of Trustees. 664 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1983).
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at least theoretically, a tougher challenge. In Missoulian v. Board of 
R e g e n ts . "  the justices were asked to rule whether the individual 
privacy rights of a university president outweighed the public's right 
to be present during an evaluation of his job performance. The right 
to know lost decisively in this important instance.
The latest two open-meetings cases, decided in 1991 and 
1 9 9 2 ,1 0 0
challenged statutory exemptions that permitted closed meetings for 
discussions about strategy related to litigation or collective 
bargaining.
In these opinions, the court clearly said that when the legislature 
makes laws that permit secrecy in government, it must provide clear 
evidence that a right to individual privacy is endangered, or the 
statutes will fall.
Here is a look at the open meetings cases, the first of which was 
decided in 1980:
The Yellowstone County Board of Commissioners held public 
meetings in 1978 to hear testimony over a new subdivision in the 
Huntley Project School District. School officials and others had an 
interest in the subdivision’s approval because of its potential impact 
on school enrollm ent. In a public m eeting in D ecem ber, 
commissioners gave conditional approval to the project, but did not 
take a formal vote. Later that same day, two of the commissioners —
"2 0 7  Mont. 513 (1983).
100The Associated Press v. Board of Public Education. 246 Mont. 
386 (1991) and Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Public Schools. 
255 Mont. 125 (1992).
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in a telephone conference call with two other county officials — 
officially approved the subdivision. A third commissioner did not 
participate in the conference call, nor was he apprised of the call in 
advance. The commissioners claimed that the telephone vote was not 
a new meeting, rather a continuation of the discussion earlier in the 
day.
The school district sued, alleging the final vote was in fact an 
illegal secret meeting primarily because the public was not given 
adequate notice that the board would be taking a final vote on the 
m atter. The Supreme Court determined first that a telephone 
conference call between a quorum of the board constituted a meeting 
under the legal definition,101 and said the telephone vote appeared 
to deliberately flout the Open Meetings Law since the time and place 
of the final vote had not been publicly announced, and since one of 
the com missioners hadn't been advised of the vo te .102 To be 
effective, the Open Meetings Law requires sufficient notice to the
101A "meeting" is defined as " ... the convening of a quorum of 
the constituent membership of a public agency, whether corporal or 
by means of electronic equipment, to hear, discuss, or act upon a 
matter over which the agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction, 
or advisory power." 2-3-202, MCA.
102Section 2-3-103(1), MCA provides that "Each agency shall 
develop procedures for permitting and encouraging the public to 
participate in agency decisions that are of signficant interest to the 
public. The procedures shall assure adequate notice and assist public 
participation before a final agency action is taken that is of 
significant interest to the public."
Further, Section 7-5-2122, MCA requires county commissioners 
to establish and publicize regular meeting times. Further, it says, 
”[c]ommissioners may, by resolution and prior 2 days' posted public 
notice, designate another meeting time and place."
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public of where and when the meeting is to take place, the court said, 
adding that without public notice, a meeting is open in theory only. 
"This type of clandestine meeting violates the spirit and the letter of 
the Montana Open Meetings Law," the ruling said.
The court further noted that the district court had ruled that 
the meeting was in fact illegal, but that it had declined to nullify the 
vote and to order a new meeting in compliance with the law. It 
ordered the board to reconvene on the matter, and criticized the
district judge for letting "substance overtake form."
Jarussi v. Board of Trustees
In 1978, a St. Ignatius High School principal, Louis Jarussi, sued 
his school board after a dispute over his salary and his subsequent 
firing. Jarussi contended board members met twice in illegal secret
sessions, the first time to consider Jarussi’s salary request for the 
upcoming year and the second time to fire him when they learned he 
had contacted a lawyer in response to their first closed meeting.
The district court found that the board's meetings violated the 
state Open Meetings Law and voided the decision.
The school board appealed, claiming state law allows secret
meetings to discuss collective bargaining strategy. The Supreme 
Court upheld the district court, saying the collective bargaining
exemption didn’t apply, since Jarussi was an individual represented
by no bargaining agent or union, nor was he acting on behalf of a
union. The court said Jarussi had a right to be present during the
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board's deliberations, and upheld damages awarded him in district 
court.103
Missoulian v. Board of Regents
Throughout the 1970s, the competing issues of right to know 
and right to privacy had not come up in an open meetings case. 
I n i980, the Missoulian sued the University of Montana Board of 
R e g e n t s 104 after its reporter, Mea Andrews, was shut out of a 
meeting in which the regents conducted an annual performance 
evaluation of UM President Richard Bowers. The regents closed the 
meeting on the grounds that Bowers' right to privacy was more 
important than the public's right to attend the evaluation. District 
court ruled in favor of the regents, and Missoulian editors appealed.
This case focused on the privacy exemption in the Open 
M eetings L aw ,105 and in so doing interpreted the central conflict 
within Art. II, Sec. 9: Do the privacy rights of a university president 
outweigh the public’s right to be present during an evaluation of his 
perfo rm ance?
The Missoulian argued that the privacy exemption in the 
Constitution was intended to protect personal matters of family or
103Jarussi v. Board of Trustees.
104Missoulian v. Board of Regents. 207 Mont. 513 (1983).
105MCA 2-3-203 (3). The statute says, in part: " ... The presiding 
officer of any meeting may close the meeting during the time the 
discussion relates to a matter of individual privacy and then if and 
only if the presiding officer determines that the demands of 
individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure."
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health — issues of autonomy not necessarily related to the 
president's job performance. Further, the newspaper said, the status 
of a university president diminishes his privacy rights because he is 
a “policy making official whose actions are of greater importance to 
the public.” 106 And finally, the newspaper argued, if the evaluation 
did contain discussion about the president’s personal life, such 
matters could be saved for private discussion, leaving larger issues 
open for public scrutiny.
The Supreme Court rejected the newspaper’s arguments one by 
one. To determine whether an individual has a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy, the court used a two-part test, which it 
had applied in a 1982 records case, Montana Human Rights Division 
v. City of Billings.107 and which the U.S. Supreme Court had devised 
in 1967 in Katz v. United States.108 The K atz test said an individual 
has a protected right to privacy when the person has a “subjective or 
actual expectation of privacy" and when "society is willing to 
recognize that expectations as reasonable.”109
The court ruled in M is so u lia n  that both prongs of the test 
applied: U niversity  presidents expected privacy  in the ir
performance reviews, the court said, because the board of regents 
had prom ised them in advance that the evaluations would be 
confidential.
iQ6Missoulian v. Board of Regents, p. 526.
107649 P.2d 1283.
108389 U.S. 347 (1967).
109Ibid .
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For the second prong of the test, the justices examined the
perform ance evaluation process in detail, and cited numerous 
examples of how secret discussions of procedures and management 
policies can actually benefit the public. A confidential evaluation is so 
important to a university president, the justices said, that he could
even fail in his job without it:
A university president depends to a 
large degree upon good relations and a strong 
im age w ithin the com m unity for the 
successful accomplishment of his job. A
university president has a good reason to
expect that his unabashed views, his candid 
evaluations of himself and his staff, and his 
perceptions of the faculty  w ill rem ain 
p riv a te .110
In part on that basis, society recognizes this expectation of 
privacy as reasonable, the court said. For further evidence, it 
reminded the Missoulian that its own publisher, then Tom C. Brown, 
had once written an editorial supporting the need for confidential 
evaluations of public officials.
No common ground could be found. The Missoulian suggested a 
compromise, and asked that the regents adopt “agenda scheduling,” 
whereby professional matters not related to the president’s privacy 
be separated from the private meeting and be discussed publicly. No 
again, said the court: "There is so much interweaving of sensitive 
material that it would have been impossible ... to separate private
110M issoulian. p. 526.
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matter from non-private to protect privacy, or to avoid destroying 
the effectiveness of the evaluations."111
AP v. Board of Education
The latest two open meetings cases struck down two of three 
exemptions to the state Open Meetings Law. In the first, decided in 
1990, the Associated Press, 11 daily newspapers and two newspaper 
organizations sued the state Board of Public Instruction112 after the 
board met in secret with its attorneys. The meeting was called to 
discuss a legal challenge to an order from the governor that the 
board submit for his review and approval a set of proposed 
administrative rules. The news organizations alleged the meeting was 
illegally closed to the public; the board responded that the closed 
session met the requirements of the Open Meetings Law, which 
allowed exemptions for discussion of litigation strategy.113
The issue, the court said, is whether the legislature has the 
authority to create exemptions to open meetings beyond the privacy 
exemption written into the language of Art. II, Sec. 9.
The Board of Education based its arguments not in political 
theory, but in public policy. On a practical level, the board said, all
l n Ibid. p. 535.
112Associated Press et. al. v. Board of Public Education. Cause 
No. BDV-89-121.
113MCA 2-3-203, (4): " ... a meeting may be closed to discuss a 
strategy to be followed with respect to collective bargaining or 
litigation when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on 
the bargaining or litigating position of the public agency."
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attorneys must have the freedom for w ide-ranging and frank 
discussions with their clients, which is only possible in private.
Furthermore, the board argued, discussing legal matters in an open
forum would divulge strategies that could sabotage the board’s case.
Placing itself on such uneven ground with an adversary would be
unsound policy and violate the client's right to due process under the 
law, the board’s attorneys said.
District court Judge Jeffrey Sherlock ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs, and Sherlock's ruling is noteworthy because his opinion — 
and much of his actual language — formed the foundation for the 
Supreme Court's next two rulings on right to know. Using a strict 
interpretation of the constitution, Sherlock said he found no basis for 
a litigation exemption, and cited three reasons for his ruling: One,
the language in Art. II, Sec. 9 is clear and unambiguous that there is 
only one exemption to openness, individual privacy; two, the state 
can assert no right to privacy on its own behalf — such liberties are 
reserved for individuals to protect them from government, not the 
other way around; and three, voiding the exemption would not, as 
the state asserted, somehow require attorneys to divulge their secret 
strategies. The right-to-know provision, Sherlock argued, does not 
compel discussion to take place at a public meeting, it simply 
requires a quorum of any board to hold its meetings in public.114
On appeal, the Supreme Court said the Montana Constitution 
was equally clear and unambiguous: The only time the government
114Cause No. BDV-89-121.
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can consider closing its meetings is when an individual’s right to 
privacy is at stake.
The court took note of two other important issues, and again 
agreed with Sherlock: The Board of Education’s argument for the 
right to due process “is unsound,” the court said, adding: “State 
agencies have never been included under the umbrella of the right to 
due process. The protections guaranteed by the constitutional right to 
due process were designed to protect people from governmental 
abuse. They were not designed to protect the government from the 
people.” 115
Finally, the court said defendant's claim on the so-called public 
policy issue — that the loss of privacy to discuss legal strategy would 
give unfair advantage to the opposition — was nonsense. The opinion 
characterized the litigation in question as "essentially a turf battle" 
between the Board of Education and the governor, which should be 
played out for all to see. "In short," the court said, "it is the public’s 
business."116
With this case decided so clearly, it wasn't hard to see that soon 
another Open Meetings Law exemption would fall, too.
In July 1990, the Board of Trustees of the Great Falls Public 
Schools, after months of labor negotiations with teachers and library 
aides, scheduled a closed meeting for September to discuss a fact­
finder's report. The Great Falls Tribune requested that the meeting 
be open, and the school board agreed. However, at the September
115Supreme Court No. 89-589 at 7.
116Ibid. p. 8.
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meeting no discussion of the report took place; the board simply
recommended that the report be rejected, took a vote, and moved on.
The Tribune complained that private discussions had taken 
place in the interim, in a deliberate effort by board members to 
avoid conducting its business publicly, thus violating the Open 
Meetings Law and the right to know provision. The newspaper sued 
in district court, and the board responded saying that an exemption 
in the Open Meetings Law allowed closed meetings to discuss 
collective bargaining issues. The district court ruled in favor of the 
board, and the Tribune appealed.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the collective 
bargaining exemption was an unconstitutional restriction of the right 
to know. The court agreed with the Tribune that Art. II, Sec. 9 
allowed a government agency to close meetings only for concerns
about individual privacy. This case, the court said, "does not involve 
a matter of individual privacy but instead involves a public agency 
desiring privacy."117
In striking down the exemption, the court said it need not 
review the wording or the intent of the right to know provision. The 
court noted it had addressed this issue in at least two previous 
rulings, in Great Falls Tribune v. District Court in 1980, and in AP v.
Board of Education. "The intent of the framers of a constitutional
provision is controlling," the court said. "We have clearly held that 
Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution is unambiguous and
117Great Falls Tribune v. Great Falls Public Schools. 255 Mont.
125.
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capable of interpretation from the language ... alone."118 The school 
board asked the court to balance the right to know against what it 
said was its "duty to supervise the school district" as outlined in 
another constitutional provision, Article X, Section 8, which says 
simply: "The supervision and control of schools in each school district 
shall be vested in a board of trustees to be elected as provided by 
law."
There was precedent for such a balancing of rights, the board 
argued, citing an open records case — Mountain States Telephone v. 
Department of Public Service Regulation119 -- in which the court 
restricted the right to know in an effort to protect a corporation's 
property rights.
But the court rejected the argument saying the telephone 
company's property rights were synonymous with privacy rights, 
and therefore the court had properly attempted to balance the right 
of privacy against the public's right to know. This case is different, 
the ruling said. "Here there is a lack of any individual privacy being 
involved," the court said. In the end, the court said, "the collective 
bargaining strategy is an impermissible attempt by the legislature to 
extend the grounds upon which a meeting may be closed."120
118Ibid. p. 129.
119634 P.2d 181.
120255 Mont. 125. p. 131.
Access to Records
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The Montana Supreme Court has decided a half-dozen cases 
involving the public’s access to government-held information. In 
th ree ,121 the court held that public boards or agencies can gather and 
use certain kinds of information for administrative purposes, yet 
withhold the information from the public. In another case,122 the 
court said law enforcement agencies in Montana can legally withhold 
many of their official records from the public.
In Mountain States v. Department of Public Service Regulation, 
the dispute centered on the phone company’s request that its “trade 
secrets” be kept from public view. The trade secrets were supplied to 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) as part of a request for a phone- 
rate increase. The PSC refused to keep the trade secrets confidential, 
saying it had a duty to share all its information with the Consumer 
Counsel, a state-sponsored agency that represents consumers during 
PSC rate-request deliberations.
Mountain Bell sued in district court and Judge Gordon Bennett 
ruled that the right to know, coupled with state statutes covering 
open records, demanded that once the PSC receives such information, 
it becomes automatically available to the public.
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned, saying Mountain 
Bell’s privacy rights deserved the same protection as an individual’s
121Human Rights Division v. City of Billings. 646 P.2d. (Mont. 
1982). Mountain States v. Department of Public Service Regulation. 
634 P.2d. 181 (Mont. 1989). Belth v. Bennett 740 P.2d. 638 (Mont. 
1987).
122Engrav v. Cragun. 769 P.2d (Mont. 1989).
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privacy, effectively ruling that in Montana law, corporations are 
"individuals" deserving the same protection as a private citizen. This 
was an unusual and controversial ruling. It was contrary to the 
intent of the framers of the right- to-know provision, who clearly 
said that the individual right to privacy did not apply to 
c o r p o r a t io n s 123 and the decision worried constitutional experts 
because it significantly expanded the rights of corporations in 
Montana law.
Finally, having ruled that the telephone company had the right 
to protect its property based on the constitutional right to privacy, 
the court needed a way to balance that privacy right against the 
right to know. The court resolved the conflict with a special 
"protective order" that limited the public's access to the trade secrets. 
The order said the PSC, the Consumer Counsel, and anyone else 
whose “interest relates to the ratemaking function” could review the 
trade secrets, but that the information must be kept otherwise 
confidential.
Such an arrangement, the court said, would give consumers 
“adequate knowledge” to fully participate in the com m ission’s 
proceedings and yet protect the privacy/property interests of the 
corporation.
It was the first time the court had ever issued such a 
protective order, but it would not be the last.
In 1982, in Human Rights Division v. City of B illings, the court 
ordered the City of Billings to turn over personnel files for evaluation
123See footnote 89.
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by the state Human Rights Division to determine if  the city had 
discriminated in its hiring practices.
The city had refused to open the records, claiming a right to
privacy on behalf of its employees, and to protect itself against 
liability for disclosing private information. The Supreme Court agreed 
in part, saying the city employees had a reasonable expectation that 
their files would be kept confidential, but it also acknowledged that 
state Human Rights D ivision could not properly evaluate the 
discrim ination  issue w ithout thoroughly exam ining em ployee 
records. As a compromise, the court again issued a protective order, 
saying the state could have access to the files, but must keep them 
confidential under penalty of contempt. Human Rights v. B illin g s  
wasn't the last of it. In 1987, in another case appealed from Judge 
Bennett’s district court, the justices ruled one more time that a state 
agency could keep secret third-party inform ation. In Belth v. 
B e n n e t t . 124 Joseph Belth, an editor of an insurance industry 
magazine, sued state auditor Andrea Bennett to obtain information 
from her files about the financial condition of insurance companies 
operating in Montana. That information had been supplied to the 
com m issioner of insurance from  the Insurance R egulatory 
Information System, a private firm.
Judge Bennett reasoned, as he had in M ountain States, that 
once the information was held by the government, citizens of the
state should have access to it. Further, Bennett challenged the high
124740 P.2d 638
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court’s earlier ruling that corporations had the same rights as 
individuals. But the Supreme Court reversed Bennett again.
Engrav v. Cragun was an unusual records case that came before 
the Supreme Court in 1989. It was presented and argued by a 
University of Montana student, Barry Engrav, who was doing a 
research paper intended to examine the quality of law enforcement 
in Granite County. He had requested access to the Granite County 
Sheriffs Department daily telephone records, criminal investigation 
files, pre-employment files, and arrest records, for use in his term 
paper. The sheriff, citing state code that protects police records, 
refused. Engrav sued, lost in district court, and appealed.
A fter exam ining a jum ble of sta te  codes regulating  
confidentiality of police records, and relying heavily on the K a tz  
"expectation of privacy" test, the Supreme Court said the privacy 
rights of individuals, coupled with the need for law enforcement to 
keep investigations secret, outweighed E ngrav’s claim  to see 
telephone logs, employee files, and criminal investigations.
A rrest records, however, were another m atter. State law 
specifically says arrest records are open documents.125 However, the 
court then noted an exemption in the codes that said whenever a 
record is compiled by name, only information about "convictions, 
deferred prosecutions or deferred sentences" is available to the 
pub lic .126
125M CA 44-503, 44-5-103(14), 44-5-301.
126MCA 44-5-301.
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The court concluded that although arrest records are open by 
statute, they are also indexed by name rather than by date of arrest, 
and therefore by statute, the state can keep the names confidential. 
“It is important to keep the right of privacy of individuals in mind 
here,” the court wrote. It then made an unusual ruling: Engrav could 
have the arrest records, but could not name individuals from those 
records in his research paper. Since the right to privacy provision 
states that individual privacy "shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest," the court declared that 
Engrav's school research project was not of sufficient state interest to 
outweigh individual privacy.127
But not all names in law enforcement records could be kept 
secret, the court ruled in anotherl989 case. In Great Falls Tribune v. 
Cascade Co. S h e r if f .128 the court said that police and other law 
enforcem ent officers have a diminished right to privacy in 
disciplinary actions and required police agencies to release the 
names of sanctioned officers.
The case began in Cascade County in 1988, when a number of 
police officers and sheriffs deputies were disciplined after they were 
involved in a high-speed chase and the arrest of a suspect, who was 
struck while on foot by a car driven by a sheriffs deputy. The 
deputy was suspended, a Great Falls police officer fired, and two 
other officers were asked to resign, which they did. The Great Falls 
Tribune requested the names of the disciplined officers and was
127Engrav. 1228.
128238 Mont. 103.
refused, so the newspaper sued. After a district court ordered the 
names released, the sheriff released the name of the deputy, but the 
city attorney appealed the ruling on behalf of the city police officers.
The Supreme Court traced the privacy issue back through 
several cases, including Montana Human R ights. M is so u lia n . and 
E n g r a v . to establish the privacy standard, but then ruled that 
although police officers may have a "subjective or actual expectation 
of privacy," it was a weak right given their "positions of high public 
trust." As such, the public had a stronger right to know since issues 
of "public health, safety and welfare are closely tied to an honest 
police force," the court said.129
And finally, the most recent test of government records, 
Associated Press v. State of M ontana.130 centered on whether an 
affidavit filed with the court in connection with a criminal charge can 
be kept secret. Such affidavits typically describe the facts that lead 
to a felony charge and are the equivalent of an indictment from a 
grand jury.
The issue arose in 1991, after the legislature amended the 
state 's crim inal procedure statutes. One of the m any new 
amendments required that the affidavits be kept sealed unless a 
judge determined they should be opened to the public.
The Associated Press, 15 state newspapers, seven television 
stations and several news organizations sued the state to have the 
statute stricken, claiming that it violated the constitutional right to
129Ibid. 107.
130250 Mont. 299.
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know. The news organizations bypassed district court and went 
directly to the Supreme Court in an effort to get a speedy ruling, 
since the new law was effectively sealing affidavits all over the state. 
The Supreme Court agreed that the issue was pressing, and ruled on 
the case within a month after the statute became effective.
The court struck down the new law, saying it did not conform 
to the constitutional right to know. In the process, the court made a 
couple of im portant findings. One, that such affidavits are 
"documents" of the type described in the language of Art. II, Sec. 9: 
"No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents ... of 
all public bodies or agencies of state government ...." And two, the 
court said the statute itself was "antithetical" to the standard of the 
right to know provision. The court noted that since the days of 
territorial government, the public had been allowed access to such 
documents, and that such access was important to the public's faith 
in the judicial system.131
Access to courts
In two im portant cases regarding access to M ontana 
courtrooms, the Supreme Court has ruled generally in favor of open 
courts, and in one, declared that the right-to-know provision holds 
Montana to a stricter standard than does the U.S. Constitution.
131 Ibid. p. 302-303.
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In Great Falls Tribune v. District Court.132 a district court judge 
granted the p la in tiffs  request to close voir dire exam ination, 
allowing prospective jurors to be questioned in secret about their 
suitability for jury duty.
The defendant in the case, Gene Andrew Austad, had been 
charged with several felony counts, including deliberate homicide, 
robbery, sexual intercourse w ithout consent, and aggravated 
burg lary .
Before his arrest, Austad had led police on a wild automobile 
chase, which ended in a wreck. Austad was permanently injured and 
spent months recuperating before he was able to stand trial. The 
crimes for which he was charged were particularly grisly, and the 
Great Falls Tribune and several TV and radio stations reported 
extensively on the case.
At trial, Austad requested that the voir dire examination be
closed, arguing that extensive publicity, including details of his
criminal record and other evidence not previously known to the
public, threatened his right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury. 
The district court, ordered by the Supreme Court to hold a special 
hearing regarding the closure, concluded that the individual voir dire 
proceedings should be limited to the defendent, the officers of the
court and one prospective juror at a time. The request was based on 
a presumption that the other prospective jurors could be tainted by 
discussion and questions during voir dire, or by newspaper coverage,
132608 P.2d 116.
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since the defendants poor physical condition threatened to extend 
voir dire for days, perhaps weeks.
The Tribune appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court based primarily on its reading of the right to know, and 
secondarily because, the court said, "we fail to see ju st how closing 
such examination to the public is necessary to guarantee the
defendant a fair trial."
In his opinion, Chief Justice Frank Haswell referred to a 
controversial U.S. Supreme Court case, Gannett Co.. Inc. v.
D eP asq u a le .133 which had upheld a "common law rule" of open civil 
and criminal trials in America. G a n n e t t , as noted earlier, was 
controversial, in part, because it also said courts could shut down 
pre-trial suppression hearings because they weren't necessarily part
of the trial. Legal experts found the case confusing, and some worried 
whether G annett allowed judges in certain circumstances to close the 
trial itself.
In any case, Haswell cited language from G an n e tt that traced 
the benefits of public trials, which included preventing "secret 
inquisitional techniques" and unjust prosecutions. A closed trial 
breeds suspicion and mistrust, Haswell said.134
The court reviewed media coverage of Austad’s arrest and 
alleged crimes, and found it "factual ... without editorializing" and "no 
more inflammatory" than routine reporting on any other brutal 
crime. There was nothing in the reporting or in the prospect of open
13399 S.Ct. 2898 (1979)
134Trihune v. Dist. Ct. at 438.
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voir dire that would jeopardize Austad's right to a speedy and fair 
trial, Haswell wrote.
In the final analysis, though, Haswell moved away from
G a n n e t t . 135 and federal precedent. Rather, he said, the Montana 
C onstitution 's right-to- know provision provides the strongest 
possible argument for open court proceedings, which included voir 
dire. In fact, he argued, Art. II, Sec. 9 imposes a "stricter standard" 
than does federal law and "clearly provides that any person has the 
constitutional right to observe court proceedings unless the demand 
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the m erits of public 
d isclosure."136
That right not being absolute, Haswell acknowledged that if 
during voir dire it became necessary to discuss potentially
inadmissible evidence, the judge may briefly close voir dire.
Haswell's argument was a blend of democratic traditions and 
the strong language in the Montana Constitution, which, he said, 
required the state courts to go further than the federal Constitution
required. His conclusion: Openness is critical to the quality and
integrity of the judicial process. Along the way he gave a strong nod
135Haswell joined those who found G annett confusing, and 
hinted that alternative interpretations were likely: "Although it is not 
entirely clear, there is reason to believe that the holding in G annett 
may not be applicable to closure of the trial itself," Haswell wrote. 
Haswell held, of course, that voir dire is part of the trial. Also, he 
likely had one eye trained on Richmond Newspapers , which was 
being argued at the Supreme Court, and he may have been confident 
that the high court would rule criminal trials open to the public.
136Tribune v. Dist. Ct. at 438.
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to free speech and the right to know. "Closure," he wrote, "is
censorship at the source — a denial of the right to know."137
Within two years, the Montana Supreme Court had ruled again 
in favor of access to the courtroom in The State of Montana ex. rel.
Smith v. District Court.138 A Great Falls man, Daniel Smith, asked the
Supreme Court to intervene and reverse a district court ruling that 
his pretrial submission hearing should be open to the public.
Smith, who was charged with deliberate homicide, claimed he 
was unlawfully arrested and that he and his home were illegally
searched without a warrant or his consent. Before his trial in district 
court, a pretrial hearing was scheduled to determine what, if any, 
evidence from the search was admissable during the trial. Smith 
asked that the hearing be closed, contending publicity about possible 
"tainted evidence" could prejudice potential jurors. The judge denied 
Smith’s request, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court considered two issues: Whether the press 
and the public could be excluded from a pretrial suppression hearing 
to ensure the right to a fair trial, and, if the hearing could be closed, 
what standard should the court use?
This time, a 1982 U.S. case, Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior 
C o u rt.139 provided some guidance. Globe allowed closure of portions 
of a criminal trial during testimony of minors who were alleged 
victims of sex crimes, but it also established that the public and the 
press have a constitutional right of access to courts under the First
137Ibid .
138654 P.2d 982.
139102 S,Ct, 2613 (1982).
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and Fourteenth Amendments. Equally influential was Haswell's 
T r ib u n e  opinion that said the Montana Constitution required a 
stricter standard for openness.
State ex. rel. Smith v. District Court went to some lengths to 
balance two fundamental constitutional rights: the right to know and 
the right to a fair trial.
The court sought to establish a standard for allowing closure 
that infringed as little as possible on public access. In framing the 
issues, Justice Frank Morrison said the right-to-know provision in the 
Montana Constitution and the right of access outlined in the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution argued strongly for 
open proceedings. Morrison also ruled that suppression hearings 
were part of the trial itself, and could not be considered separate.
Thus, he said, a judge in Montana could close a suppression 
hearing only if the resulting publicity could create a "clear and 
present danger" to the fairness of the trial, and then only if the judge 
could find "no reasonable alternative means" to avoid the effects of 
the publicity.
The ruling detailed how the courts should discover a clear and 
present danger, suggesting judges consider, for example, "empirical 
evidence" of newspaper readership and "expert psychological 
testimony" about "the capacity of an individual to disregard pretrial 
publicity." Morrison also suggested judges attempt to avoid the clear 
and present danger altogether by enlisting the media's cooperation 
not to publicize details from the suppression hearing until after the 
jury is empaneled. And finally, he instructed judges to consider
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alternatives such as a change of venue for the trial, sequestering the 
potential jurors, and even special instructions. M orrision adopted 
these guidelines directly from the American Bar A ssociation 
standards for resolving conflicts between access and trial fairness.
In all, the decision leans in favor of keeping pretrial hearings 
open if possible, but Morrison made it clear: The right to a trial by an 
impartial jury is a right to be balanced against the right to know; the 
right to know is not absolute.
Analys i s
Whenever the Montana Supreme Court examined the right to 
know as it conflicted with another constitutional liberty, it sought a 
balance that reasonably satisfied both liberties. In cases where the 
right to know conflicted with statutory protections, the court used a 
variety of methods to evaluate the strength of the right to know. 
With either approach, it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff sought 
access to records, meetings or the courts. As such, it may be more 
helpful to analyze these cases with less emphasis on what type of 
access was being sought, and more emphasis on the court's methods.
First some general observations:
1. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly in access cases that 
its interpretation of the right to know or of related statutes would 
rely on the plain meaning of the words, and that it needn't pursue 
"extrinsic methods of interpretation" if the language was clear.140 
Where government agencies have attempted to justify secrecy based 
on any other interpretation, the court has been adamant: Bureaucrats 
may not deny public access for purposes of expediency or personal 
comfort or some other ad hoc public policy reason. The court has said 
repeatedly that the only exemption in the right-to-know provision is 
individual privacy. It has also said, however, that the right to a fair 
trial — which is not part of the language of Art. II, Sec, 9 — can 
trump the right to know. In short, any arguments for denying public
140See G.F. Tribune v. G.F. Public Schools. Also Keller v. Smith. 
170 Mont. 399, State v. Cardwell. 187 Mont. 370, G.F. Tribune v. 
District Court. AP v. Board of Education.
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access are suspect if they aren't grounded in the rights to privacy or 
fair trial.
2. Where an argument for individual privacy is the basis for 
denying access, the court also has been fairly consistent in its 
approach. The "reasonable expectation of privacy test" has been the 
primary tool for determining a privacy interest, and the court has 
routinely used a balancing test to resolve conflicts between a right to 
privacy and a right to know.
That is not to say that the court has applied the "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test appropriately in each instance. In at least 
one important case, M ountain States v. Dept, of Public Service 
R egu la tion , the application of the K atz test may have resulted in an 
unnecessary clash between the right to know and the right to 
privacy. And finally, the court has not, in my view, established a 
workable standard for determining how strong the right to privacy 
is. As a result, the court has said, for example, that police officers, 
because of their im portant positions of public trust, have a 
dim inished right of p rivacy ,141 and that university presidents, 
because of their  important positions of public trust, do not.142
3. The court has ruled that the public should have broad access 
to courtrooms based on the few cases so far. The right to know 
provision, the court has said, holds the state to an even stricter 
standard for openness than does the federal law. Moreover, in cases 
where the right to privacy or the right to a fair trial is jeopardized by
141G.F. Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff.
142Missoulian v. Board of Regents.
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publicity, the court has said that Montana judges must use the least 
restrictive means possible to protect such rights, and must consider 
any number of alternatives to keep the courtroom open. Only after 
those alternatives have been exhausted may a judge close portions of 
a trial or related trial hearings.
The cases: A closer look
In two open meetings cases — Y ello w sto n e  and Ja ru ss i — the 
facts are simple, and the violations clear. The cases make the lesson 
equally clear for bureaucrats, agencies and supervisory boards: The 
right to know coupled with the Open Meetings Law make it the 
government’s duty to open business to the public at all times, unless 
individual privacy is threatened, and to follow the law that requires 
sufficient public notice about when and where meetings will be held.
By ordering the commissioners in Yellowstone County to redo 
their m eeting and vote again, the court said im plicitly  that 
government agencies must not sidestep the democratic process in the 
interests of expediency. Participation must be full, or the system is 
not truly democratic. The court in both cases quoted from the right- 
to-know provision: “No person shall be deprived of the right ... to
observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies ... ." In  
the three cases that challenged statutory exemptions to the open 
meetings law — Associated Press v. Board of Public Education. G .F. 
Tribune v. G.F. Public Schools and Associated Press v. State — the
court was equally clear: Unless the exemption deals with individual
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privacy, it is unconstitutional on its face. In all three cases, the court 
maintained a strict interpretation of the Constitution. In two of the 
three cases the court deferred to the framers and their explicit desire 
that the legislature not make exemptions beyond what is allowed by 
the plain language of the right to know provision.
These cases, however, represent only three challenges to the 
dozens of statutes that regulate access to information collected and 
controlled by state agencies. As others are challenged, will they stand 
or be stricken? These cases suggest a couple of possibilities.
One view says that if the statutes are not grounded in some 
privacy interest, they are presumably unconstitutional. In A ssociated  
Press v. State, the court investigated the legislative record to see if 
lawmakers, when they passed the statute sealing the affidavits, were 
concerned about the defendant's privacy. It found no such legislative 
intent, and partly on that finding, ruled the law unconstitutional.
In another view, the court has shown it can create a right to 
privacy where none was intended by the framers. The court said in 
M ountain States that trade secrets are a property right and a privacy 
right that corporations and private citizens share equally, thereby 
extending the right of privacy to a corporation. But the framers 
explicitly said the language in the privacy exemption in the right to 
know did not to apply to corporations. Nonetheless, after M o u n ta in  
S ta te s , corporations can now claim the right to individual privacy to 
protect property. By this standard, records that contain proprietary 
information gathered by the state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation,
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for example, may well be inaccessible to the public based on a 
privacy exemption.
Finally, public policy unrelated to the right to privacy may 
protect some government-held information according to the ruling in 
E n g ra v . While Great Falls Tribune and AP v. State suggest it is 
unconstitutional to seal records without an individual privacy 
finding, Chief Justice Turnage said in E ngrav  that "public policy of 
this state cannot permit" the release of law enforcement files related 
to ongoing criminal investigations.143 Opening such records to the 
public would damage "law enforcement security," Turnage said. 
While Engrav did not challenge directly the statute that protects such 
files, Turnage clearly suggests the court would consider other 
arguments besides individual privacy to prevent public access to 
some  government records.
But the remark in E ngrav  is far from doctrine, and the court's 
overall record seems to suggest that statutes not grounded partly or 
wholly in a constitutional liberty are suspect.
Right to Know v. Right to Privacy
In several cases from the early 1980s, the court used balancing
tests to resolve conflicts between two fundamental rights in the 
Constitution — the right to know and the right to privacy. One — 
M isso u lian  — was an open meetings case; the rest tested access to
records. The state Constitution expressly considers the right to
143769 P.2d 1224 at 1227.
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privacy in two places: an exemption for privacy is part of the right to 
know provision, and Art. II, Sec. 10 makes privacy a fundamental 
right: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of 
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a 
compelling state interest."144
These access cases raise a number of important issues and 
suggest some trends in the court's thinking. Any analysis, however, 
may be more meaningful with a brief review of the right to privacy 
and its development in U.S. and Montana political history.
University of Montana professor and constitutional expert 
Larry Elison and a University of Montana Law School graduate, 
Dennis Nettik-Simmons, traced the history of the right to privacy in a 
1987 Montana Law Review article.145 Privacy by definition, and "[i]n 
the broadest context possible" is "the right to be let alone by other 
persons as well as by the government," they wrote.
Modern privacy rights are rooted in part in the natural law 
concepts developed by John Locke, the authors say. Locke, as 
indicated in the first chapters here, argued that property rights were 
an extension of an individual's ownership of himself: "[E]very man 
has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but 
h im self."146
Such an interpretation, Elison argues, "sheds some light on what 
the courts, for nearly a century, have been calling privacy." In U.S.
144Montana Constitution. Art. II, Sec. 10.
145"Right of Privacy." Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 (1987).
146Locke, Second Treatise of Government. (Thomas Reardon ed, 
1952) (1st ed. London 1690).
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law, the right to privacy is generally linked to the Fourth
Amendment ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects ... .") and was developed as a eommon-law 
right in the opinions of Justice Louis Brandeis in the 1920s.147 
Several Supreme Court decisions helped establish a general right to 
privacy, most notably Wolf v. Colorado148 in 1949, Mapp v. Ohio149 in 
1961, Griswold v. Connecticut150 in 1965, and most important for this 
discussion, Katz v. United States151 in 1969.
By 1972, when the Constitutional Convention established the 
right to privacy in the new constitution, Elison says, the concept had 
been recognized by the state Supreme Court for 50 years. Privacy 
rights in case law were applied typically to search-and-seizure
issues, Elison said, but the constitutional convention transcript makes 
it clear the drafters intended the right also to "protect citizens from 
illegal private action and from legislation and governmental practices 
that interfered with their autonomy to make decisions in matters 
that are generally considered private."152
This is essentially what Locke argued, that people are
inherently individuals and no one has a right to control your person
or your property.
147See Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438 (1927) Brandeis 
d issent.
148338 U.S. 25.
149367 U.S. 643.
150381 U.S. 479.
151389 U.S. 347.
152Elison, "Right of Privacy." p. 13.
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Individual autonomy, however, under the umbrella of "the 
right to be let alone," doesn't go far enough to describe privacy at 
issue in the Montana cases. Thomas Huff, University of Montana 
professor or philosophy and law, outlines what he calls "the privacy 
norm," a concept that embraces our most intimate activities, thoughts 
or conversations.153 The government or the press — or any intruding 
entity, for that matter — invades privacy when it takes "an interest 
in what we are doing, in how we are conducting our lives, or in what 
we are saying." The intrusion becomes unwarranted, Huff says, when 
someone is "in the position of knowing things about us which he or 
she should not know."
The invasion is compounded, then, by further disclosure of 
inform ation — about, say, sex lives, medical history, intimate 
friendships, and so on — allowing others to make judgments about 
us. The potential damage, of course, is generally to reputations and 
occasionally personal wealth. Our privacy is invaded, Huff explains, 
"because we are treated as the potential objects of others' gratuitous 
evaluations rather than as persons."
This allows the "right to be let alone" to be seen in two distinct 
ways: One is a kind of privacy that allows us to be free from others
gaining and distributing infomormation about our actions, thoughts, 
and behavior, and the second is a kind of privacy that protects us 
from government interfering with our decisions about our private
153Huff, Thomas, 55 Washington Law Review. 1980. Huffs 
analysis criticizes the court for failing to distinguish between types of 
privacy, leaving a legacy of confusion over how to evaluate privacy 
rights.
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conduct. One speaks to what people know about us; the other to our 
autonomous choices about such things as relationships, marriage, 
birth control, religious beliefs, etc. which have the least to do with — 
or impact on — others outside our private spheres of home, family 
and relationships.
In Montana, the Supreme Court cases since 1972 reviewed 
here centered on disclosure of information, and thus "norm of 
privacy" cases by H uffs definition. In each, the court applied the 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" concept from Katz, which, Elison 
says, has become the "primary if not the sole method" of establishing 
a right of privacy by the Montana Supreme Court. And in each, the 
test helped the court determine that a right of privacy existed.
But Katz guided the court only in f ind ing  a right to privacy. In 
most access cases, the court has used a "balancing test" to weigh the 
right to privacy against the right to know. The question becomes, 
then, whether the court's overall approach properly values the right 
to know, given the framers' intent that the courts lean in favor of the 
rig h t to know w henever the two righ ts conflic ted . Such 
considerations provide a helpful framework to analyze some of the 
cases.
In Human Rights D ivision, the court said personnel records 
deserved protection, and few disagree that such files are generally 
kept confidential and are rarely made public — they often contain 
detail that would allow, as Huff outlined, others to make possibly 
unwarranted judgments, and the kind of inform ation that people 
value for its privacy. Yet the court recognized that the state had a
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logical and sufficient reason to inspect the files to determine whether 
the city of Billings was discriminating against certain employees. In 
the interests of public policy, the court found a utilitarian solution: It 
issued a special protective order restricting circulation of the files to 
members of the Human Rights Division, thereby protecting the 
privacy of the individuals, and allowing controlled access to the 
information by a state agency that claimed a need.
Human Rights Division was perhaps a logical decision in a case 
which offered few easy alternatives. All parties seemed to get what 
they wanted, and the expectation of privacy was one that most in 
society may find reasonable. Nonetheless, the resolution of H u m an
R ig h ts  presumes a measure of trust in government that some in 
society may be unwilling to grant. Who, after all, will be monitoring 
the Human Rights Division to guard against abuse? In that sense, the 
case institutionalizes secrecy in a manner that conflicts with the 
sentiments of political theorists like Meiklejohn, who argued that no 
pertinent information should be withheld from citizens, and Mill, 
who argued that proper self-government never granted powers to
government beyond which the individuals had themselves.
The case has other notable dimensions, as well. For one, H um an 
Rights Division marked the first time that the court said that a third
party could assert the privacy rights of an individual (HRD was
ordered under penalty of contempt to keep third-party information 
private). Two, it was also the first time a special protective order 
was used in combination with both the K atz test and the balancing 
test to resolve a right-to-know case.
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It wasn't long before the court applied the same combination to 
another access case — M ountain S ta tes. This time, with more 
troublesome results. As noted, the legacy of Mountain States is that it 
extended individual privacy rights to a corporation. Elison argues 
that the debate transcripts clearly show that the drafters never 
intended individual privacy to be applied to corporations.
One could argue that it was a Lockean view that led the 
Supreme Court to extend privacy rights as it did in M ountain States. 
If, as Locke proposed, property and liberty are roughly synonymous, 
then the court could logically argue, as it did in Mountain States, that 
trade secrets are "property" deserving protection and that the 
telephone company as owners of that property should be treated the 
same as an individual would be treated under similar circumstances. 
But this does not mean, nor should it mean, that a faceless 
corporation should be protected under the "privacy norm," as Huff 
describes it, and all that it encompasses.
Further, that aspect of M ountain S tates could have been 
avoided had the court considered a different approach that would 
have yielded a greater victory for openness and avoided the issue of 
privacy rights altogether. For example, if the court would have 
considered the trade secrets simply a "good" rather than a liberty, 
and resolved it in the same manner as any similar instance when the 
government takes property from its citizens: Simply reimburse them 
for any financial losses that occur.
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Thus the justices could have upheld the lower court, declared 
the records open for public inspection, trade secrets and all, and 
simply ordered the state to make restitution, if necessary.
As it stands, the ruling partially and unnecessarily blocks
citizen access to an important process: monitoring state regulated 
monopolistic practices. As Elison further argues, "This is precisely the 
kind of public agency deliberation the constitutional provision (of the 
right to know) intended to allow the citizenry to observe."154
Finally, had the court ruled in this fashion, then the decision to 
grant "individual" status to a corporation would never have arisen,
and the court could have preserved the intent of the framers that 
only true individuals could assert the right to privacy.
Missoulian & Engrav: Bad cases, bad law
The impact of Missoulian v. Board of Regents is significant, and
for many in the press, dismaying. For one, it was the first test under
the new Constitution that required the court to balance individual 
privacy against the right to know. Second, it tested the privacy 
rights of one of the most public citizens in the state: A university 
president whose perform ance is of great public in terest and 
importance. Unfortunately, the decision appears to have closed off all  
access to this evaluation process, which journalists and others fear 
may exclude the public from important discussions elsewhere — at
154Elison, "Right of Privacy." p. 48.
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school boards or whenever highly placed public officials claim a right 
to privacy during an evaluation of their performance.
This decision was also contrary to the framers’ intentions about
how the right to privacy should be applied. Delegate Dorothy Eck, 
speaking for the right to know committee, said the drafters feared 
the privacy exemption might be used to improperly exclude the 
public from important discussions about how government officials 
performed, again, making the distinction between information that is 
important to the autonomy of an individual and information that is 
important to the functioning of a democracy.155
She specifically referred to instances when it may be necessary
to dismiss an "agency head" or other officials in "local school board
situations, local government situations, and many others." It was 
with this in mind that the committee carefully worded the exemption 
to say the demands of privacy must "clearly" exceed the merits of 
public disclosure.
The court could have approached M issoulian differently. To see 
how, it is helpful to look at Elison’s criticism of the Katz test itself.
In his evaluation of privacy rights and his criticism of K a tz . 
Elison says the test overemphasizes an individual's "subjective" 
expectation of privacy. Elison quotes Supreme Court Justice Harlan, 
who devised the two-part test in K atz and who later in a dissent 
warned that the test "should not be overly emphasized." Harlan 
worried that an individual's expectations of privacy are often little 
more than "reflections" of the status quo rather than a standard for
155Con Con of 1971-72. Vol. V, Verbatim Transcript, 1670-71.
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what information ought to be protected.156 Harlan's thinking has an 
application to M issou lian . Where did Bowers' expectation of privacy 
originate? He was advised by the regents when he was appointed 
that his performance evaluations would be confidential. As such, his 
"expectation of privacy" was rooted in status-quo policies, which 
largely reflect practices in the private sector where job performance 
reviews are typically part of an employee's confidential files.
Even in the public sector, it is commonly acknowledged that 
regents boards, school boards, and myriad other boards and agencies 
prefer the comfort of private conversations where participants are 
free to speak as they wish and not be held accountable in the press. 
It is also a natural impulse to resist publicity when a performance 
evaluation is critical or negative.
But it is precisely such a circumstance — an evaluation of a 
public servant whose performance may be inadequate, or at least 
questionable — for which the right to know was intended. However 
uncomfortable it may be for university presidents, school principals 
or agency directors, they must in a dem ocratic system  b e 
accountable to the people who entrusted them with their position. 
And, as Locke said, that trust is preserved only if power of 
government is retained by the people and not turned over to the 
b u rea u c ra ts .157 The intent of the Montana Open Meetings Law also 
speaks directly to this issue: "The people of the state do not wish to
abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them." The
156See U.S. v. White. 401 U.S. 745, 768. (1971).
157Locke, Second Treatise. Sect. 141. (ed. P. Laslett) Cambridge.
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right to know should allow citizens to observe when a school 
superintendent or a similar public servant is under fire, delegate 
Dorothy Eck said at the Constitutional Convention.
Instead, the court in M isso u lia n  fashioned an argument for 
safety, comfort, ease and convenience, and, on one hand, blurred the 
distinction between truly private information and the kind of
discussion that should be open in order to make democracy function 
better. On the other hand, the court failed to heed Harlan's warning 
about missapplying K atz. In M issoulian . the reasonable-expectation- 
of-privacy test wrongly emphasized a subjective expectation of 
privacy and blinded the court to more important democratic values.
The court also missed at least one other opportunity to speak 
up for open government. After determining that the right to
individual privacy applied in M is so u lia n . the court then failed to
properly value that right. It rejected reasoning from the newspaper
that a university president, as a highly visible and trusted public 
servant, should not enjoy the full privacy rights of an ordinary 
citizen. Rather, the court seemed to say that university presidents 
may even have an enhanced right to privacy: "Indeed the sensitive 
nature of the presidential function suggests that there is all the more 
reason to expect confidentiality in presidential evaluations."158
Thus, once the court determined that Bowers' right to privacy 
was strengthened by his position, it was unsurprising that the final 
balancing of rights swung against the right to know. The court 
further rejected a compromise suggested by the M issoulian that
158Missoulian v. Board of Regents. 207 Mont. 513, 526.
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some portions of the review process could remain open to the public 
without violating Bowers' individual privacy. The language and tone 
of this decision seems contradictory to the long-held view by the 
court — and the intent of the framers — that openness in 
government is highly valued, and that the government should take 
the least restrictive means to protect privacy.
It may be a final irony that following the closed-door 
evaluations of several university system presidents, regent President 
Ted James said that, in his opinion, most of the annual review 
sessions could have been open to the public with little harm to 
anyone .159
The Engrav case is perhaps the most difficult to analyze, in part 
because the plaintiffs request was so broad, and in part because the 
opinion reviewed a large number of statutes in an effort to respond. 
A larger problem, perhaps, is that Engrav represented himself before 
the court, and failed in many ways to argue the appropriate points of 
law. His broad requests for information -- phone logs, radio call 
records, files the sheriff compiled in hiring law enforcem ent 
personnel, criminal investigation files, and arrest records -- were 
based on a general argument that all the records were necessary to 
adequately assess the quality of law enforcement in Granite County. 
While his intentions were praiseworthy, and his logic defensible, 
Engrav failed to challenge directly the constitutionality of the 
individual statutes that prevented his access to the records. Engrav 
argued that, in addition to the constitutional right to know provision,
159Ibid at 517.
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state statute 2-6-102, MCA, set the standard for access. The statute 
says that "every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any 
public writings of this state."
Sheriff Cragun responded that the statutes in the Montana Criminal 
Justice Information Act of 1979 governed the release of information. 
More specifically, Cragun argued, 44-5-103, MCA, defines "public 
crim inal justice information" as court records and proceedings, 
convictions, deferred sentences, postconviction proceedings, initial 
offense reports and arrest records, bail records, daily jail rosters and 
statistical information that does not identify specific individuals.
The justices sided with the Granite County sheriff and 
considered Engrav's arguments in the specific context of a statute 
defining "public criminal justice information." On the broader issue 
of whether the individual right to privacy of people whose names 
existed in the files Engrav sought outweighed the public's right to 
k n o w , 160 the justices applied the K a tz  test and ruled that 
(presumably all) citizens who call the police on criminal matters 
"have an actual expectation of privacy." The court also said persons 
who are arrested but subsequently released "without charges or 
incarceration" deserve privacy because such people "must be 
protected from public persecution."161
In the interests of public policy, then, the court declared as 
constitutional a string of law enforcement statutes that restrict the 
public's access, and in so doing granted a broad blanket of privacy
160Engrav v. Cragun. 769 P.2d 1224 at 1225.
161 Ibid at 1228.
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for entire groups of people without careful examination of the kind 
of privacy it was protecting.
Further, the court also accepted common police arguments that 
opening records to the public would cripple law enforcem ent 
investigations. "[P]ublic policy .... cannot permit" the release of 
ongoing criminal investigations, the court said (it never mentioned 
closed criminal investigations), adding that opening such records 
would have a "disastrous effect" on police officers' ability to perform 
their duties.
Finally, of course, Engrav gained access to arrest records which 
are listed in the statute as "public information," but astoundingly was 
prohibited from reporting individual names from the records, a 
practice common in the press and protection highly valued in a 
society that is rightly sensitive to abuse of authority, including 
harassm ent or false arrest by police or other law enforcem ent 
officials.
That issue raises questions about another aspect of E ngrav: The 
court’s interpretation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. 
Is it reasonable to presume, in a society in which the press routinely 
and thoroughly reports on criminal activity, and in which we 
routinely scrutinize police activities to guard against abuse, and in 
which we are guaranteed the right to face our accusers, that people 
seriously and generally expect privacy when making contact with 
their local law enforcement agencies? One might as easily argue that 
citizens actually expect to be publicly identified, form ally or 
informally, as a result of their contact with the law. One might also
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argue that any citizens who believe themselves to be the subject of 
police abuse may well want the protection provided by publicity. A 
broader view, based on the idea that access to information may in 
fact improve government, might suggest that the whole area of 
confidential law enforcement records should be re-examined.
Another troubling aspect of Engrav is the court's notion that an 
attempt by any citizen — whether doing a student research paper or 
not — to critique the quality of law enforcement isn’t a compelling 
endeavor that warrants a measure of constitutional protection.
The watchdog role of citizens over their government agencies 
is firmly established in American democracy. Where better to spend 
energy and time than analyzing whether local police and sheriff's 
departments are responding appropriately to reported crimes, using 
adequate investigative procedures, hiring quality em ployees, and 
establishing "standards that taxpaying citizens were entitled to?"162 
The court failed to acknowledge, even incidentally, the fundamental 
value, much less the right, of citizens to inform themselves in order 
to guard against government abuse, or to aid in governm ent’s 
im provem ent. C hief Justice Turnage's condescending language 
trivializes Engrav's efforts and insults his academic approach. 
"Appellant wishes to do a study for a school research project," 
Turnage wrote. "[Tjhis is not a sufficient state interest."163
Finally, though the court in several privacy cases leaned clearly 
in favor of openness by applying what it considered the least
162Ibid at 1225.
163Ibid at 1229.
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restrictive means of protecting privacy, it veered off in the opposite 
direction in E n g rav  and M is so u lia n . While neither of these cases 
suggest a new direction for the court, they at least leave confusion 
about what the standard is for balancing privacy against the right to 
know.
Here apply Huffs norm of privacy. Does Missoulian and Engrav 
represent the "norm of privacy" type intrusion? Is this information 
that we truly desire to keep private so that others don’t unfairly or 
gratu itously  judge us? In Missoulian, I would argue no, partly 
because by the nature of Bowers' position, he would enjoy a 
diminished right here. And if it did, again, the process could have 
been designed to protect Bowers "norm of privacy." In Engrav, 
clearly the court was worried that publicity may cause unwarranted 
judgments about some individuals whose privacy was invaded.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, one question remains: Do the citizens of
Montana enjoy the fullest advantage of their unique constitutional 
p rov ision?
In its many rulings on the right to know, the Supreme Court 
has only occasionally endorsed the fullest measure of access to 
government-held information. And it has occasionally ignored the
plain words and clear intentions of the men and women who framed 
the right to know in Montana's Constitution.
Yet, some good things have happened, especially where the
court has focused more on government process, and less on the
natural tension between the right to know and the right to privacy.
The state's Open Meetings Law has been strengthened as the
court stripped away unconstitutional exemptions. Meetings generally 
must be open and bureaucrats can't exclude the public to discuss 
litigation or collective bargaining strategy. As the right-to-know 
provision says, individual privacy is the only exception. Courtrooms, 
too, generally must be open, as the court has rightly woven together 
the American tradition of openness in criminal matters with the 
strong language of the Montana Constitution. W ith refreshing 
eloquence, the justices embraced the rewards of open courtrooms: 
trust and integrity, fairness and justice.
Beyond these easier cases, however, where the court wrestled 
more directly with the conflict between individual privacy and open
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government, it left a legacy of inconsistent reasoning and troubling 
conclusions.
For example, the court has emphasized in several cases that it 
was required to rely on the plain language of the constitution, the 
statutes and the framers' intent to interpret the right to know and 
individual privacy.
But when the framers said they clearly intended individual 
privacy to apply to people and not corporations, the court in 
M ountain States ignored the framers’ intent (in fact there is no 
indication in the case that the court reviewed the transcripts of the 
Constitutional Convention for guidance) and granted individual 
privacy status to a corporation.
When the framers said the language of the privacy exemption 
was designed to make sure the public wouldn't be shut out of 
meetings in which important public matters would be discussed, the 
court in M issoulian  closed public access to evaluations of university 
p residen ts .
The court itself said a public servant — a university president - 
- in a position of high public trust enjoys an enhanced right to 
privacy, and that such a status may actually im prove job 
performance. Then the court said that a public servant — a police 
officer — in a position of high public trust enjoyed a diminished 
right to privacy, and that such a status actually improves his job 
perform ance.
Though the statute and political tradition suggest that open 
arrest records protect the public from potential abuse by law
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enforcement agencies, the court in E n g ra v  refused to allow the 
publication of names of individuals arrested in Granite County.
Clearly, in these more complex cases, the justices have strayed 
off course. What makes them do so? At least two factors seem 
significant: One, the court has yet to find a workable standard for 
evaluating privacy, and two, the justices seem easily swayed by the 
reasonable and persuasive arguments for expedient public policy.
Most of the privacy cases — M is so u lia n . E n g ra v . M o u n ta in  
S tates. G.F. Tribune v. Cascade County -- involved issues in which the 
public had a strong interest: The performance of a university 
president, the rates for a regulated monopoly, and criminal activities 
within a community. In none of the cases did the court attempt to 
clarify what is truly personal privacy -- issues involving health, 
family, personal finance, and the like — and privacy that public 
officials or corporations simply desired in the interests of efficiency, 
expediency or public policy. In M isso u lia n . for example, the court 
stubbornly refused to distinguish between the two, and recognized a 
broad right to privacy that overrode the right to know. In G .F . 
T r ib u n e , the court recognized a narrower right to privacy and 
properly said the right to know outweighed it. In M ountain S tates, a 
right to privacy was virtually invented, contrary to the framers' 
intent. In E n g ra v . the court cited broad public policy reasons for 
extenting privacy protection to unknown and unnamed citizens, none 
of whom requested it.
Is it unfair to ask the court for a clearer standard for when a 
right to privacy applies, and how it should be valued?
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Issues of public policy have, in some instances, held greater 
sway on the court than the plain language of the law or the framers’ 
intentions. Clearly, in two of the worst rulings -- E n g rav  and
M is so u lia n  — the court was persuaded that public servants' jobs 
would be made easier and their performance enhanced by shutting 
off public access. In neither case did the court appear to give serious 
consideration to the more worthy arguments for open government, 
nor did it seriously attempt to weigh the value of openness in a 
democracy or how secrecy can erode the trust of its citizens. In fact, 
implicit in some of the decisions is an onerous notion that citizens 
should be satisfied with a certain level of blind  trust in government 
leaders. Regents, sheriffs and the public service regulators, these 
opinions suggest, can operate at a level beyond mere trustees of the 
people. By these rulings, public officials gain undue power by their 
rarified access to information. And because average citizens are 
denied that same information, bureaucrats have another advantage: 
they escape full accountability to the people they serve.
At another level, these decisions parallel some of the less 
flattering proposals of some of the 18th and 19th century political 
thinkers. Though Locke and Mill, for example, proposed ways 
democracies can protect themselves from the tyranny of the rulers, 
their elitism and intellectual arrogance prompted some undemocratic 
ideas. Both philosophers rationalized ways society could exclude 
some from  having equal benefits and pow er in government. 
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court has occasionally taken 
the same view: Opinions in M issoulian . E n g rav . Mountain States and
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other cases, allowed an elite few access to information, from which 
they must make decisions presumably in the interests of all. The rest 
are left not only ignorant, but expected to trust a government that 
itself has been made less accountable.
Alexander Meiklejohn preached a democratic gospel that was 
purer. "If by suppression," he once said, "we attempt to avoid lesser 
evils, we create greater evils."
When suppression limits citizens' access to information, it shifts 
the balance of freedom from the governed to the governors, which is 
precisely the "greater evil" Meiklejohn feared.
Meiklejohn was critical of all efforts to balance the right to 
information against some other societal interests, and thus would 
have disapproved of such efforts by the Montana Supreme Court. The 
search for information, he said, is not an ordinary activity that we 
should bargain away. "When men decide to be self-governed, to take 
control of their behavior, the search for truth is not merely one of a 
number of interests which may be 'balanced,' on equal terms, against 
one another. In that enterprise, the attem pt to know and to 
understand has a unique status, a unique authority, to which all 
other activities are subordinated."
If we fail to recognize that uniqueness, Meiklejohn contended, 
we fail to recognize the importance of individuals in democracy and 
we diminish their freedom.
"It is 'we' and not 'they' that must be free," he said. "If we 
break down that basic distinction we have lost sight of the 
responsibilities and the dignity of a 'citizen'. We have failed to see
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the role which public intelligence plays in the life of a democracy. We 
have made im possible the understanding and the teaching of 
government by consent of the governed."
It is against this argument that the court’s various attempts to 
pro tect public policy interests and lim it citizens' access to 
information can be viewed. In M is s o u lia n . M ountain S tates, and 
E n g ra v . the justices failed to properly consider the "greater evil" of 
eroding citizens' right to search for truth, and sought to balance that 
right against the significantly weaker interests of public policy.
One only need ask a few rhetorical questions to bring this 
issue into clearer light: In M is so u lia n . which is the greater harm, 
allowing ordinary citizens to observe the performance evaluation of a 
university president, or limiting citizens' access to information that 
better allows them to hold public servants accountable? In M oun ta in  
S ta tes , is the harm in revealing a corporation’s trade secrets equal to 
the danger of excluding ordinary citizens from a democratic process 
that allows them to make fully informed decisions? In E n g ra v . is 
protecting the names of individuals who show up on police blotters 
more important than eroding fundamental freedoms?
Such individual questions spring from the distinction between 
the kind of expression that should be protected and the kind citizens 
in a democracy may want to limit. We have recognized the inherent 
conflict in the First Amendment between autonomy (freedom of 
religion) and instrum ental (free speech) values. We have also 
recognized that the framers of the Montana Constitution sought to 
further clarify those values by drafting the unique right to know
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provision. The questions, then, are deceptively simple: Is it the kind 
of information that political theorists and the framers intended to 
protect in order that discussion be more robust, the debate more 
thorough, so that democracy can function more fully? Or, is it the 
kind of information to which access should be limited in order to 
preserve individual autonomy and privacy? If the court reflected 
more carefully on this distinction, it could fashion a more consistent 
stan d ard .
Such a focus also may help remove the clutter caused by side 
arguments over public policy, efficiency and comfort. And it respects 
the distinctions made by Locke, Mill, Meikeljohn, and the framers 
who, in their wisdom, sought to broaden rather than limit citizens' 
access to issues and information.
Practicing the right to know
An academic analysis, which has occupied the bulk of this 
thesis, is but one way to access the right to know in Montana. 
Another way, which is quicker, easier, and somewhat more alarming, 
is to enumerate the day-to-day problems of access encountered by 
the media as they attempt to gather the news and fulfill their role as 
watchdogs over government. Such an assessm ent reveals that, 
irrespective of political theory and Supreme Court decisions, the 
press continually encounters closed meetings, sealed records and 
limited access to government-held information.
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In an effort to unlock m eeting-room  doors and unseal
documents, several Montana newspapers and broadcasters joined
with the Associated Press several years ago to establish a Freedom of 
Information Hotline. The FOI Hotline provides a telephone number 
that reporters and editors may call for advice whenever they 
encounter problems gaining access to the news. Questions about 
access are fielded by attorneys for the Helena law firm of Reynolds, 
Motl, Sherwood and Wright, which provides the service for a 
monthly fee paid through membership dues.
AP bureau chief John Kuglin is chairman of the Montana FOI 
Hotline Board, and has for several years tracked, catalogued and 
reported the number and types of complaints from reporters and
editors throughout the state.164
In just the last two years, the hotline receivedl55 calls. A 
rough breakdown shows reporters and editors had the most 
problems with access to records — 60 calls -- and closed meetings — 
53 calls. Problems with access to courtrooms or with judges issuing 
gag orders were a distant third — 17 calls in all.
Interviews with Kuglin and James Reynolds, an attorney and 
partner in the law firm that provides hotline advice, reveal the 
m ajority of the problems with closed records stem from law
enforcem ent agencies denying access to police blotters and jail 
rosters. In other words, local police chiefs and sheriffs won't release 
the names of people arrested and held in jail.
164Montana AP Wire Watch. February, 1994. The Montana FOI 
Hotline News Flash. Winter, 1993.
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School districts, too, arbitrarily and commonly refuse access to 
records, Kuglin said.
And despite clear rulings from the Supreme Court, city and 
county commissions across the state continue to hold illegal closed 
meetings, or fail to routinely publicize upcoming meetings, Reynolds 
said. Troubling, too, Reynolds said, is an increasingly common 
practice by commission members to gather in groups too small to 
constitute a quorum, in an effort to discuss public business out of 
public view. Reporters routinely complain they are excluded from 
school board meetings where personnel issues are on the docket, 
Reynolds reported.
Reynolds said he has no accurate way of knowing how often 
reporters are barred from records or meetings that aren't reported to 
the hotline. However, he said, most — perhaps as high as 90 percent 
— of the problems that do get reported are resolved on advice from 
hotline attorneys.
Reynolds said he believes ignorance, rather than a desire to 
skirt the law, is to blame for most of the problems. In many sparsely 
populated areas of Montana where aggressive reporting is rare, 
officials are often simply unaware that the Constitution or the 
statutes require them to do business openly. Once advised, Reynolds 
said, they usually comply.
However, a few of the Supreme Court decisions continue to 
plague reporters. E n g ra v  is commonly used by local officials to 
protect arrest records, in spite of a widely circulated opinion by the 
state attorney general's office that advised local officials not to use
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the opinion to routinely shut off access to police blotters. But clearly 
it's still being done.
M is s o u lia n . Reynolds said, has "closed the door" on most 
evaluations of public officials, and perhaps worse, kept reporters and 
editors from even challenging such closed proceedings. Further, 
M isso u lia n  is commonly cited when reporters request resumes or 
other background information on candidates for im portant school
district or university jobs, M isso u lia n  "gets applied across the 
board," Reynolds said.
Overall, however, Reynolds is optimistic that neither case will 
prevail in the long run. He said he believes both cases are 
"aberrations," and don’t necessarily reflect where the court is headed. 
Other decisions, most notably G.F. Tribune v. Cascade County Sheriff. 
suggest the court is beginning to view the right to privacy more
narrowly, Reynolds said. As the court continues to struggle with the 
tension between privacy and the right to know, "the right to know is 
emerging as a stronger right," he concluded.
Nonetheless, a look at FOI Hotline records suggests that all 
manner of agencies and bureaucrats are easily inclined to close off 
access to governm ent-held information. The responsibility  for 
challenging those efforts falls largely on members of the Montana 
media, since they are the first to encounter secrecy, and are best
equipped to fight it. But reporters and editors must take it upon
themselves to educate an uninformed board chairman, to sue an 
obstinate bureaucrat, and hire the lawyers who can plead the case
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for the right to know, as articulately and vigorously as possible, 
before the courts in Montana.
As John Stuart Mill once said, the democratic institutions 
themselves provide the best remedy for the worst m ishiefs in 
society. If members of the media are thus com mitted, and if 
Reynold's optimism is warranted, then the Montana right to know 
provision can afford far better protection for those citizens who truly 
"do not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which 
serve them."
A d d en d u m
In December 1993, the Montana Supreme Court ruled in a case 
out of Billings that a reporter can be excluded from a meeting
between city employees and a private contractor without violating 
the Open M eetings Law or Art. II, Sec. 9 of the Montana
C onstitution.165
The facts are these: In May 1992, a reporter from KTVQ
television learned of a scheduled meeting between two Billings city 
employees — the city engineer and the director of public works — 
and two private contractors working on a local street project. The
meeting was to discuss construction delays and how to keep 
surrounding property owners better inform ed of construction 
problems. The reporter was barred because it was a "staff meeting," 
and because the firms requested the media be excluded.
KTVQ sued in District Court and won its argument that it had a 
constitutional right to attend the meeting. The city appealed and the 
Supreme Court reversed. In its decision, the court said:
1. The meeting was not a "staff meeting," as the city alleged,
because the private firms were not part of the city staff.
2. The state Open Meetings Law would require the meeting be
open only if it could be determined it was a meeting of a "public 
agency."
165KTVO v. Citv of Billings. No. 92-449 (Mont. 1993). NOTE: This 
case was concluded as the final touches were put on this thesis. It is 
an important case and deserves inclusion, however, it does not shift 
the focus of this report, nor change its conclusions.
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3. Based on interpretations of the Open M eetings Law, 
transcripts of the Constitutional Convention debates, and prior cases, 
the two city employees did not constitute "governmental agencies" or 
"public agencies" since neither "had rule-m aking authority and 
regulatory powers." Therefore, there is no constitutional requirement 
the meeting be open.
Five justices signed the majority opinion; two justices joined in 
a dissent.
Sadly, this ruling fits with several of the court’s worst opinions 
on the right to know. The court seemingly went searching for 
evidence to redefine a public servant — in this case, as someone who 
does not  act on behalf of the agency he works for. In so doing, the 
court also invented another way to allow government officials to 
retreat to the comfort and seclusion of secret meetings.
Justice Trieweiler in his dissent picked apart the majority 
opinion, pointing out that the court itself ruled only months earlier in 
Great Falls Tribune v. Great Falls Public Schools that "The language of 
[Article II, Section 9] speaks for itself. It applies to all persons and all 
public bodies of the state and its subdivisions w ithout exception  
(emphasis added)."
Trieweiler also hinted at the court’s occasional predilection to 
let public policy arguments outweigh the plain interpretation of the 
law. Simply, he wrote, there can be no "public policy reason" to deny 
the media access to such meetings.
Finally, Trieweiler rightly concluded this ruling "is a substantial 
blow to the public’s right to know guaranteed by our State
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Constitution. It allows public agencies and their officers to conduct 
public business in secret and without public scrutiny. This is not in 
the public's interest and is exactly what our constitutional right to 
know was designed to prevent."
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